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ABSTRACT

This Article examines the significance of the New Jersey Supreme

Court's recent decision in Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Paulsboro
for redevelopment and property rights in New Jersey. It suggests that
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Gallenthin, discuss post-Gallenthin opinions that have applied Gallenthin, and suggest some
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Gallenthin has resulted in the revival of meaningful judicial review of
municipal redevelopment designations. Specifically, the Authors contend
that Gallenthin confronted two pervasive problems concerning judicial
review of redevelopment designations. First, since 1947, when New Jersey
adopted a constitutional provision that specifically authorized the legislature
to pass laws permitting the taking of property for redevelopment of "blighted
areas," courts have unduly acquiesced to legislative and municipal
interpretations of "blight." Gallenthin addressed this trend by reaffirming
that the judiciary is responsible for ensuring that only "blighted areas" are
subject to redevelopment. Second, although municipal fact-finding is entitled
to deference if supported by substantial evidence, courts often deferred to
municipal redevelopment designations based on an expert's conclusory
testimony that the property satisfied the statutory requirements for
redevelopment. Gallenthin clarified that judicial deference is proper only if a
municipality presents meaningful, quantitative evidence that directly
correlates to the relevant statutory criteria. Indeed, post-Gallenthin judicial
review provides property owners with great protections without frustrating
legitimate redevelopment initiatives.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
AB STRA CT ................................................................................................................

4 51

INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................

453

I.

458

A HISTORY OF REDEVELOPMENT IN NEW JERSEY .................................................

A. Redevelopment andEarly American Public HousingInitiatives..................... 460
B. New Jersey's Extensive Early Experience with Redevelopment ...................... 462
C. The 1944 Redevelopment Companies Law and the 1946 UrbanRedevelopment
46 6
L aw ..................................................................................................................
II. THE 1947 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND THE GENESIS OF THE "BLIGHTED
A REAS CLAUSE". .................................................................................................
A. The Committee on the Legislative Rejects a ConstitutionalProvision

468

Addressing Redevelopment ..............................................................................
B. The Convention Adopts a Redevelopment Provision.......................................

469

Ill. THE PERCEPTION

471

OF PLENARY LEGISLATIVE REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

AFTER 1947 ......................................................
474
A. The BlightedAreas Clause as a Grantof PlenaryRedevelopment Authority .474
B. The Legislature'sAssumed Authority to Define "Blight" andProgressive
Expansion of the Scope of Redevelopment....................................................... 476
C. JudicialReview of Redevelopment Legislation Under the Blighted Areas

2009]

GALLENTHIN REALTY DEVELOPMENT

Clause ..............................................................................................................

4 79

IV. THE (IN)SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD AFTER 1947 ................................

483

V. GALLENTHiN AND ITS PROGENY: MOVING TOWARDS A BALANCED APPROACH TO
REDEVELOPMENT AND PROPERTY RIGHT PROTECTIONS ...................................... 486

487
A. Gallenthin v. Borough of Paulsboro ................................................................
1. Paulsboro's Interpretation and Application of the LRHL ............................ 487
489
2. The Court's O pinion .....................................................................................
B. ReclaimingJudicialReview of Redevelopment Designations: The Legislature's
CircumscribedRedevelopment Authority After Gallenthin .............................. 490
C. Reclaiming JudicialReview of Redevelopment Designations: The Substantial
494
Evidence StandardAfter Gallenthin ................................................................
VI. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AFTER GALLENTHIN .............. 497

A. When Does the Constitution Permit Redevelopment of Non-Blighted Property
Because it is Partof a Larger Blighted Area?................................................. 497
B. How Often Does the Constitution Require Municipalities to Reevaluate Their
499
Redevelopment Designations?.........................................................................

500
CON CLUSION ......................................................................
INTRODUCTION

New Jersey is the most densely populated and heavily developed state in
the country.1 In addition to its large population and limited size, New
Jersey's aggressive land preservation and smart growth policies further limit
the amount of developable land.2 New Jersey's existing housing stock is also
1.

New Jersey consists of 7,471 square miles and has at least 8.7 million residents. See

Brian Uzdavinis, Note, To Save or Not to Save: Historic Preservation in New JerseyJustifications,Hindrances,Future, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 649, 651 (2007) (citing U.S.
Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary: Population, Housing Units, Area, and Density,
available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/34000.html). Thus, on average, New
Jersey is home to more than 1,100 people per square mile. This means that New Jersey's
population is denser than both India and Japan. Jon Gertner, Chasing Ground, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Oct. 16, 2005, at 46.
2. New Jersey has "some of the most aggressive land preservation and smart growth
policies in the nation .... Reforming the Use of Eminent Domain for Private Redevelopment
in New Jersey 4 (N.J. Dep't of the Pub. Advocate May 18, 2006) [hereinafter Reforming
Eminent Domain in New Jersey]. For example, New Jersey's Local Redevelopment and
Housing Law, "encourages growth through redevelopment within existing towns and
municipalities based on the premise that a community grows smarter by not growing
outward." Uzdavinis, supra note 1, at 690 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-1 (West 2007)).
New Jersey also has aggressive environmental land preservation legislation, see, e.g.,
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among the oldest in the country.3 Developers estimate, therefore, that New
4
Jersey will be fully built-out within the next ten to fifteen years.
These demands on New Jersey's developable land have created a
precarious tension. On the one hand, as the New Jersey Public Advocate has
observed, "the prosperity of New Jersey's communities is more reliant on
redevelopment than perhaps any state in the nation."5 Indeed, New Jersey is
littered with antiquated plats, buildings, and street plans that inhibit modem
development. 6 Unlike other less-developed States, some measure of
government intervention is necessary to remove these7 impediments to
development and protect communities from harmful blight.
On the other hand, there is significant opportunity for abuse of property
rights in New Jersey. Unlike the Federal Constitution and many state
constitutions,8 New Jersey's Constitution expressly authorizes the use of
Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9B-1 to -30 (West 2008);
agricultural land preservation legislation, see, e.g., Agriculture Retention and Development
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:1C-1 Ito -48 (West 2008); and New Jersey's Municipal Land Use
Law authorizes municipalities to preserve historic structures through zoning, see N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40:55:D-2 (West 2008).
3. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-437.2(d) (West 2008) (estimating that there are two
million homes in New Jersey built before 1978); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 507
(N.J. 2007) (Zazzali, C.J., dissenting) (noting that New Jersey's housing stock is among the
oldest in the country with one million homes built before 1950).
4. Gertner, supra note 1, at 46, 52 (citing interview by Jon Gertner with Professor
Robert Lang, Co-Director, Metropolitan Institute at Virginia Tech (Oct. 16, 2005)).
5. Reforming Eminent Domain in New Jersey, supra note 2, at 4.
6. New Jersey was settled in the 1630's and is one of the oldest states in the country.
Rebecca Hersh, Historic Preservation, Smart Growth Recommendations From New Jersey
Future, N.J. FUTURE, Mar. 2005, at 1. More than two-thirds of its urban structures were
constructed before 1959. Id. As a result, the configuration of roads and other public services
are outdated in many of New Jersey's urban areas. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A: 12A-2(a) (West
2008) (declaring that "commercial and industrial installations, public services and facilities
and other physical components and supports of community life" exist in New Jersey in
conditions of "improper, or lack of proper, development....").
7. Reforming Eminent Domain in New Jersey, supra note 2, at 4; Hon. Peter G.
Sheridan, Kelo v. City of New London: New Jersey's Take on Takings, 37 SETON HALL L.
REv. 307, 324 (2007).
8. The Federal Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to take private
property for public use, but the United States Supreme Court has long held that "[tihe right of
eminent domain inheres in the federal government by virtue of its sovereignty ... " James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 (1937). The power of eminent domain is, of course,
restricted by the Fifth Amendment. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 n.7
(1984). Many state constitutions expressly grant the legislature the power of eminent domain,
see, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2, but few state constitutions identify private redevelopment
as a valid "public purpose" for which private property can be taken; see e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art.
II, § 17 (not identifying private redevelopment as valid public purpose).
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eminent domain for redevelopment by private entities. 9 The Garden State's
large population and limited size mean that land is at a premium, and,
consequently, there is significant private capital willing to finance this
redevelopment.' 0 Municipalities are easily tempted by "redevelopment"
proposals that promise to replace less profitable land uses such as lowincome housing with more lucrative uses. 1 It is imperative, particularly in
New Jersey, that municipalities are held in check by meaningful legal
protections for property owners. 12
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New
London,13 New Jersey has been sharply criticized for failing to provide
property owners with adequate legal protections against "eminent domain
abuse."'14 This criticism is not unfounded. Over the past several decades, the

N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 1, provides:
The clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment of blighted areas shall
be a public purpose and public use, for which private property may be taken or
acquired. Municipal, public or private corporations may be authorized by law to
undertake such clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment; and
improvements made for these purposes and uses, or for any of them, may be
exempted from taxation, in whole or in part, for a limited period of time during which
the profits of and dividends payable by any private corporation enjoying such tax
exemption shall be limited by law. The conditions of use, ownership, management
and control of such improvements shall be regulated by law.
9.

Id.
10. For example, the much publicized redevelopment of the beachfront in the City of
Long Branch attracted almost $1 billion in private investment. See Bill Bowman, Poll: Don't
Seize Homes for Private Development But Eminent Domain OK For Schools, Open Space,
ASBURY PARK PRESS, Oct. 5, 2005, at Al. Other billon-dollar redevelopment plans in New
Jersey include redevelopment in Fort Monmouth, see Keith Brown, Towns' Input Yields
Changes in FortPlan, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Aug. 21, 2008, at Monmouth Section, and a plan
to redevelop landfills at the Meadowlands; see Harry S. Pozycki, Op-Ed., Corzine Should
Close Loopholes in Pay-to-Play Law, ASBURY PARK PRESS, May 21, 2008, at Opinion
Section.
11. See Antoinette Martin, Taking On the Role of Tempter, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2008,
at RE 10 (discussing the replacement of small businesses with more lucrative uses, such as
condominiums, as part of a redevelopment plan in Harrison, New Jersey).
12. See generally Repairing New Jersey's Eminent Domain Laws-Abuses and
Remedies (N.J. Dep't of the Pub. Advocate May 29, (2007) (follow-up report) (documenting
examples of alleged "eminent domain abuse").
13. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
14. In August 2007, the Castle Coalition released its report, 50 State Report Card-Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since Kelo, (Castle Coalition Aug. 7, 2007)
[hereinafter 50 State Report Card]. The report concludes that "New Jersey is one of the
nation's worst eminent domain abusers and is one of the states with the most work to do in the
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New Jersey legislature has steadily expanded the statutory grounds on which
a municipality can take property for redevelopment. 15 Indeed, the current
statutory criteria are susceptible to almost unlimited application 6 and New
Jersey is one of only a few states 17that have not yet enacted any post-Kelo
eminent domain reform legislation.
However, an even greater threat to property rights has been the absence
of meaningful judicial review for property owners.' 8 A survey of New
Jersey's eight-decade long experience with redevelopment reveals that the
1947 Constitutional Convention was a turning point for judicial review of
redevelopment legislation and municipal redevelopment designations.' 9 In
1947, the Constitutional Convention adopted a provision that specifically
authorized the legislature to pass laws permitting municipalities to take
private property for redevelopment of "blighted areas. 20 The purpose of the
provision was to attract private investment to finance redevelopment by
eliminating any question as to the constitutionality of taking property for
redevelopment by private developers. 2' After 1947, courts consistently
acquiesced to legislative and municipal interpretations of "blight., 22 Courts
legislature." Id. at 34. Fueling this criticism is the fact that, unlike the majority of states, New
Jersey's legislature has not yet enacted any post-Kelo eminent domain reform legislation. Id.
15. See Reforming Eminent Domain in New Jersey, supra note 2, at 10-13 (discussing
the legislative history of New Jersey's current redevelopment statute).
16. Id.at 7-9; see also Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d
447, 456-57 (N.J. 2007) (describing Paulsboro's interpretation of subsection (e)).
17. See generally 50 State Report Card, supra note 14 (summarizing legislative reforms
after Kelo); Elaine B. Sharp & Donald Haider-Markel, At the Invitation of the Court: Eminent
Domain Reform in State Legislatures in the Wake of the Kelo Decision, 38 PUBLIUS 556
(2008) (summarizing legislative reforms after Kelo). On the heels of Kelo, the New Jersey
Legislature proposed eminent domain reform legislation that has not yet been passed. See
Lawmakers Seek End of Eminent Domain in N.J., COURIER POST, Aug. 8, 2008, at South
Jersey News (discussing the proposal of Assembly Bill No. 1492, a response to the Kelo
decision). That legislation has been significantly revised and has still not been passed. See
Michael Booth, Senate and Assembly Sponsors Forge Assent on New Eminent Domain Law,
N.J. L.J, June 22, 2009, at Al; Mary Fuchs, NJ. Lawmakers Say UpdatedEminent Domain
Law Possible by Year's End, NJ.COM, June 15, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/
2009/06/afteryears of negotiationbet.html.
18. See discussion infra Part II.
19. See discussion infra Parts I and III.
20. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 1; see generally discussion infra Part II.
21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. The case that set the tone for this deferential review of redevelopment legislation
was Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837 (N.J. 1958); see generally discussion infra
Part III (discussing the effect of the Wilson decision on judicial review of redevelopment in
New Jersey after 1947).

2009]

GALLENTHIN REALTY DEVELOPMENT

deferred to the legislature's ever expanding definition of "blight" without
adequately addressing whether those definitions exceeded the constitution's
circumscribed redevelopment mandate.23 Courts also frequently deferred to a
municipality's interpretation of the scope of its redevelopment authority
without addressing whether the municipality's claimed redevelopment
authority was overbroad. 4
The Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Gallenthin Realty
Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro25 addressed this undue deference
and, as demonstrated by subsequent lower court decisions, has revived
meaningful judicial review of municipal redevelopment designations in at
least two ways. First, Gallenthin clarified that although New Jersey's
Constitution expressly authorizes the taking of private property for
redevelopment, the constitution limits redevelopment to only "blighted"
areas. 27 More important, the court rejected the municipality's argument that
redevelopment legislation is insulated from judicial review because New
Jersey's Constitution "authorizes the Legislature, not the Judiciary, to define
'blight' . . . .,28 Rather, the court held that although "redevelopment is a
valuable tool for municipalities faced with economic deterioration in their
communities, ,,29 the Judiciary retains the authority to review legislation and
ensure that only "blighted" areas are subject to redevelopment.30
23. See, e.g., Wilson, 142 A.2d at 842-49 (not addressing whether blighted areas clause
places any restrictions on legislature's redevelopment authority but holding that "no
reasonable argument can be made that the connotation ascribed to [the term "blight"]
overreaches the public purpose sought to be promoted by the Constitution"); Levin v. Twp.
Comm. of Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 22 (N.J. 1971) (discussing the constitutionality of the
Local Housing Authorities Law without mentioning whether the blighted areas clause places
any restrictions on the legislature's redevelopment authority); Forbes v. Bd. of Trustees of
South Orange, 712 A.2d 255, 260-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (recognizing that
blighted areas clause may impose restrictions on the legislature but declining to define or
enforce any restrictions); see generally discussion infra Part III (addressing the courts'
acquiescence to legislative definitions of "blight").
24. See generally discussion infra Part IV (discussing the substantial evidence standard
of review as applied before Gallenthin).
25. 924 A.2d 447 (N.J. 2007).
26. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 1.
27. GallenthinRealty Dev., Inc., 924 A.2d at 460.
28. Id. at 456.
29. Id. at 460.
30. Id. at 456. Property owners can challenge the taking of their property in court by
proving that their property is not "blighted" within the meaning of New Jersey's Constitution.
As a corollary, municipalities must first demonstrate that an area is "blighted" before they can
engage in redevelopment. Several post-Gallenthin cases have properly undertaken this
analysis. See Harrison Redev. Agency v. DeRose, 942 A.2d 59, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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Second, Gallenthin affirmed that a municipality's finding of "blight" is
not entitled to deference by a reviewing court unless that determination is
supported by substantial evidence on the record. 3' The court further stated
that the substantial evidence standard requires quantitative evidence that
directly correlates to the relevant statutory criteria.32 The court emphasized
that conclusory statements by an expert that the subject property satisfies the
statutory criteria are not, on their own, sufficient.3 3 This procedural safeguard
forces municipalities to engage in meaningful research and investigation
before they declare property blighted and subject to redevelopment.34
These basic principles are reshaping New Jersey's eminent domain
practices by providing property owners with much-needed protections while
not preventing redevelopment of genuinely "blighted areas." This Article
will explore Gallenthin's impact on redevelopment in New Jersey. Section I
will place Gallenthin in context by uncovering New Jersey's notable history
with redevelopment before the adoption of the 1947 constitution. Section II
will provide a comprehensive look at the genesis of New Jersey's unusual
constitutional provision that expressly authorizes the use of eminent domain
for private redevelopment. Part III will discuss the deference that
characterized judicial review of redevelopment legislation after 1947, and
Part IV will discuss the substantial evidence standard as applied by courts
during that time. Part V will discuss Gallenthin's impact on redevelopment
in New Jersey and the post-Gallenthin cases that have applied Gallenthin's
precepts. Finally, Part VI will raise some unanswered questions facing
courts, municipalities, and the legislature after Gallenthin.
I. A HISTORY OF REDEVELOPMENT IN NEW JERSEY

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New
London,35 which held that the taking of property to sell for private
2008) (applying Gallenthin'sconstitutional requirement that property be "blighted"); Cramer
Hill Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. Primas, 928 A.2d 61, 70-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
(applying Gallenthin's constitutional requirement that property be "blighted"). The court
recognized an exception to this requirement where non-blighted property is "integral" to
redevelopment of the larger blighted area. Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc., 924 A.2d at 464.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See City of Long Branch v. Anzalone, No. A-0192-06T2, 2008 WL 3090052, at *24
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 7, 2008) (per curiam) (applying the substantial evidence
standard as articulated in Gallenthin).
35. 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
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development qualified as a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, set off a furious national
debate regarding the appropriate use of the states' eminent domain power for
redevelopment.3 6 Property owners lamented the ruling as an unprecedented
assault on individual property rights.37 Municipalities and local governments
celebrated the decision as endorsing a much-needed tool in their efforts to
protect the public from unsanitary and harmful blight.38
Notwithstanding the pubescent passion that the Kelo decision incited
throughout the country, 39 New Jersey has a long history of balancing and
accommodating these competing concerns. A proper understanding of the
court's decision in Gallenthin requires that it be viewed in the context of
New Jersey's eight-decade-long experience with redevelopment.4n Indeed,
New Jersey's history shows that its current redevelopment legislation is not a
recent assault on property rights but rather the culmination of incremental
legislative action originally directed towards genuine public harms.4 1
Similarly, the courts' review of redevelopment legislation over the past
eighty years demonstrates a healthy and constructive although sometimes
imbalanced, institutional dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature
regarding the scope of property rights and the appropriate use of eminent
domain for redevelopment.4 2 It is within this context that the court's ruling in
Gallenthinmust be understood.

36. See Michele Alexandre, "Love Don't Live Here Anymore ": Economic Incentivesfor
a More Equitable Model Of Urban Redevelopment, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 7-13
(2008) (discussing controversy stemming from Court's decision Kelo); Avi Salzman,
Homeowners Shown the Door, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at 14CN; Bill Slocum, Diner's
Owner FretsAbout Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at 14CN.
37. See Salzman, supra note 36, at 14CN.
38. See Ronald Smothers, In Long Branch, No Olive Branches, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2005, at 14NJ (discussing municipalities' reactions to Kelo decision).
39. See, e.g, The American Conservative Union, Judicial Activism Strikes Again:
Supreme Court Rules Government Can Seize Your Home, June 23, 2005, available at
http://www.conservative.org/pressroom/06232005_un.asp (stating that Kelo stands for the
proposition that "the government can take away your home any time it wants to build a
shopping mall" and the Kelo "ruling is a slap in the face to property owners everywhere.").
40. New Jersey enacted its first redevelopment statute in 1938, the New Jersey Local
Housing Authorities Law of 1938, ch 19, 1938 N.J. Laws 65, which was immediately
challenged in court. See infra Part I.B. (discussing the Local Housing Authorities law as the
beginning of New Jersey's experience with redevelopment legislation and its attendant
imposition on property rights).
41. See discussion infra Part L.A-B.
42. See discussion infra Part IA-B.
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A. Redevelopment andEarly American Public Housing Initiatives
As early as the mid- to late-1800s, many Americans were concerned
about growth of urban "slums. 4 3 Advocates for the poor focused particularly
on the role of landlords in creating and perpetuating unsanitary living
conditions and called for legal reform.44 New York City, for example,
adopted various ordinances and regulations during
the mid-i 800s that were
45
designed to counteract the city's growing slums.
Most notably, in 1895, New York passed the Tenement House Act of
1895,4 which authorized the City Board of Health to condemn and demolish
buildings that were unfit for human habitation.4 7 This legislation is believed
to have been the first of its kind in the United States. 8 Although the
legislation was relatively unsuccessful in clearing slums because of sporadic
enforcement, its express purpose was to authorize the condemnation and
taking of privately held tenements that were declared unfit for human
habitation.49
It was not until the 1920s and 30s, however, that the taking of private
property for redevelopment, rather than the condemnation of tenements,

OF

43. See JACOB A. Rns, How THE OTHER HALF LIVES: STUDIES AMONG THE TENEMENTS
NEW YORK (Sam Bass Warner, Jr. ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1970)

(1890); THE TENEMENT HOUSE PROBLEM (Robert W. DeForest & Lawrence Veiller eds.,

1903); Lawrence Veiller, Housing Reform Through Legislation, 51 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sc. 68 (1914); see also Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban
Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 7-8 (2003)
(discussing the public's concern regarding public housing problems in the late 1800s).
44. See Roy LUBovE, THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE SLUMS: TENEMENT HOUSE REFORMS
IN NEW YORK CITY 4-8 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1890-1917) (1962).
45. See id.; Mark Peters, Note, Homelessness: A Historical Perspective on Modern
Legislation, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1209, 1216-17 (1990) (discussing the immigrant situation and
housing problems attendant to it in New York City and the resulting legislative efforts to
address these problems).
46. 1895 N.Y. Laws § 8, ch. 567. See Keith Aoki, Race, Space, andPlace: The Relation
Between Architectural Modernism, Post-modernism, Urban Planning,and Gentrification,20
FoRDHAM URB.L.J. 699, 713 (1993) (discussing New York's Tenement House Act).
47. Id.; Pritchett, supranote 43, at 7-8.
48. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 786-87 (2003); David A. Marcello, Housing Redevelopment
Strategies in the Wake of Katrinaand Anti-Kelo ConstitutionalAmendments: Mapping a Path
Through the Landscape of Disaster,53 Loy. L. REv. 763, 769 n.20 (2007); Pritchett, supra
note 43, at 7.
49. Id.at 8. Although this legislation did not authorize condemnation for purposes of
giving the property to private developers, some contemporary advocates endorsed such a
position as early as the early 1900s. Id.at 8 n.27.
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became a viable premise in American jurisprudence. 50 Indeed, "the principle
that one person's property could not be taken and given to another was
ingrained in" early American legal thought.5 Nevertheless, that dogmatic
principle was tempered by the pragmatic realization that government
intervention was necessary to curb the rapid urban decline caused by the
construction boom of the 1920s.52 As early as the 1930s, states began to
authorize the taking of private property by the exercise of eminent domain
for the construction of public housing. 3 These initiatives were aimed at
ensuring that "persons of low income" were not "forced to reside in . ..
insanitary and unsafe accommodations. 54
The majority of courts that reviewed these statutes upheld their
constitutionality.5 5 A few courts, however, ruled that the taking of private
property for public housing was not a "public purpose" justifying the
exercise of the state's eminent domain power.5 6 For example, in 1935, a
federal district judge in Kentucky ruled that public housing was not a public
purpose because
[i]f the property of the citizen can be condemned and taken... simply
because the legislative department ...

may determine that the use to

which this property is to be put is for the general welfare, the property
of every citizen in this country would be subject to the whims and
50. Id. at 13-14.
51. Id.at 13. Further bolstering this belief was the fervent conviction that the best
protection against socialism was the heightened protection of individual property rights. Id.
52.

See generally JOEL SCHWARTZ, THE NEW YORK APPROACH: ROBERT MOSES, URBAN

LIBERALS AND REDEVELOPMENT OF THE INNER CITY (1993) (discussing the effect of
construction boom of 1920's on New York's housing stock). The construction boom meant
that land in the cities was increasingly at a premium. As a result, there was increasing pressure
to ensure that land was put to the most efficient and appropriate use. Pritchett, supra note 43,
at 13-14.
53. See Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Redevelopment in
the 21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895, 899 (2006). This state action was aided by
federal legislation that provided cities and states with funds for slum clearance. See Housing
Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified at 42 U.S.C §1441 (2000)); see also
Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of
Community Participationin Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 868-70 (2001)
(discussing the Housing Act of 1949's Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal Program).
54. 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch 19, 1938 N.J. Laws 65; see also Romano
v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 10 A.2d 181, 182 (N.J. 1939) (referencing work of Jacob Riis for
the proposition that slum clearance legislation was designed to protect tenants from slums

created by landlords).
55. See, e.g, New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 153-54 (N.Y. 1936);
see also Pritchett, supra note 43, at 25.
56. See id. at 23 (collecting cases).
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57

theories of any temporary majority.
Although these public housing initiatives were aimed at preventing the
spread of blight and slums, they did not expressly authorize the taking of
private property for redevelopment by other private persons or entities.5 8
Rather, these statutes authorized government housing authorities to take and
retain private property for the purpose of constructing and operating public
housing. 59 Indeed, property owners were actually perceived as causing the
slums by exploiting poor tenants. 60 Thus, these statutes authorized the taking
of private property for construction and ownership of public housing by
government agencies, not private redevelopment.6 1 In fact, most statutes
prohibited government housing authorities from operating public housing
projects for a profit.6 2
B. New Jersey's Extensive EarlyExperience with Redevelopment
New Jersey was an active participant in this early debate. In 1938, the
New Jersey legislature enacted the Local Housing Authorities Law
("LHAL"), 63 which was the Garden State's first redevelopment statute. The
57. United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (D. Ky. 1935), affd, 78
F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935); see Pritchett, supra note 43, at 24-25 (discussing United States v.
Certain Lands in Louisville).
58. See Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance
Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 606-07 (1949).
59. Indeed, most statutes provided that the favorable tax treatment afforded the housing
authorities was lost if the property was not owned and controlled by the housing authority.
See, e.g., 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch. 19, § 21, 1938 N.J. Laws 84 ("[S]uch
housing authority projects are hereby declared to be public property devoted to an essential
public and governmental purpose ... as long as such property remains under the exclusive
control and jurisdiction of a housing authority or public body which owns or holds such
property.").
60. See also Romano v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 10 A.2d 181, 182 (N.J. 1939) (citing
work of Jacob Riis for the proposition that slum clearance legislation was designed to protect
tenants from slums created by landlords). The essential point is that these early statutes differ
from modem redevelopment statues because they were primarily concerned with protecting
tenants and not the elimination of blight.
61. See, e.g., 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch. 19, §§ 5-8, 1938 N.J. Laws 7075.
62. See, e.g., id. § 9, 1938 N.J. Laws 75 ("[N]o housing authority shall construct or
operate any such project for profits, or as a source of revenue for the municipality or the
county."). This declaration is significant given the stated purpose of modem redevelopment
statutes to increase local revenue by eliminating blight and encouraging more profitable uses.
Id. § 3, 1938 N.J. Laws 65-66.
63. 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch. 19, 1938 N.J. Laws 65. The Legislature
also enacted the 1938 Housing Co-Operation Law, ch. 20, 1938 N.J. Laws 87, and
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LHAL authorized local governing bodies to create public "Housing
Authorities. '" 64 These Housing Authorities were endowed with "essential
government functions ' 65 including the power of eminent domain.66 The
Authorities were created to abolish and clear slums 67 and provide "decent
safe and sanitary dwellings, apartments or other living accommodations for
persons of low income. 9968
Pursuant to the LHAL, the City of Newark passed an ordinance creating
the Housing Authority of the City of Newark.69 In March 1939, the Housing
Authority determined that certain parcels of privately owned property were
"necessary to acquire . .. for the purposes of building a public housing
project for families of low income., 70 The property owners sued, claiming
a
that the taking of private property "to effect slum clearances" was not
"public use" justifying the exercise of the state's eminent domain power. 71
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the property owners' position.72
In Romano v. Housing Authority of Newark, the court held that "there is no
more reason why the legislature of our state may not, under its power of
eminent domain, take private property in order to effect slum clearances than
amendments to the 1938 Eminent Domain Act, ch. 21, 1938 N.J. Laws 92, in conjunction with
the LHAL.
This legislation was in direct response to available federal funds under the Housing Act
of 1949. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF CAMDEN, HOUSING IN CAMDEN (1942),
[hereinafter
available at http://www.dvrbs.com/hacc/camdenNJ-housingauthority.htm
HOUSING IN CAMDEN] (discussing negotiation of Local Housing Authorities Law and its
relationship to the Federal Housing Act).
64. 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch. 19, § 5, 1938 N.J. Laws 69.
65. Id.§ 8 1938 N.J. Laws 73.
66. Id.at 74. The State's eminent domain statute was expressly amended to include a
section entitled "Condemnation by a housing authority." 1938 Eminent Domain Act, ch. 21, §
2, 1938 N.J. Laws 93. This section authorized the use of eminent domain for the purposes
described in the LHAL. Id.
67. 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch. 19, § 4, 1938 N.J. Laws 68. The LHAL
defined slums as "any area where dwellings predominate which, by reason of dilapidation,
overcrowding, faulty arrangement of design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities,
or any combination of these factors, are detrimental to the public safety, health and morals."
Id.Notably, the clearing of slums was authorized only if the property was converted "into a
public area, like a park, and other recreational purposes." Id.The Authorities were not
authorized to convert demolished slums by giving property to other private developers. Id.
68. Id.
69. Romano v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 10 A.2d 181, 182 (N.J. 1939).
70. Id.
71. Id.The property owners also argued that the LHAL was invalid because it
improperly delegated legislative power to the Housing Authority, and the tax exemption
provided under the LHAL was improper. Id.at 183.
72. Id.at 184.
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that it may take private property in order to provide for roads, railroads and
swamp clearances. 73 The court held that slum clearance was a "valid public
purpose" because "[p]oor housing conditions ... definitely produce disease,
an early death rate, as well as many juvenile delinquents. 74 The court
concluded, therefore, that the property owners' rights must give way to the
general welfare and the taking of private property was justified.7 5
However, a little more than a year later, the court was asked to clarify its
holding. In Ryan v. Housing Authority of Newark, 6 several Newark property
owners sued to stop the taking of their property for the construction of a
public housing project.77 The property owners argued that the Authority
could not take their properties because, unlike Romano, the subject
properties were not sufficiently deteriorated to constitute a "slum. ' 78 The
Authority argued that the taking of private property for the construction of
public housing was, in itself, a "public use" justifying the exercise of
eminent domain. 79 The court agreed and held that the construction and
operation of low-income public housing was a "public use" justifying the
exercise of eminent domain.8 ° Integral to the court's holding was the fact that
the LHAL prohibited the "operation of such project[s]
for 'profit, or as a
8
source of revenue to the municipality or the county.' 1
These rulings paved the way for the proliferation of public Housing
Authorities in New Jersey. As the court noted in Romano, by 1939, at least
eleven other municipalities had created Housing Authorities.8 2 These
Authorities had been approved for more than $15,905,100 in combined
73. Id.
74. Id. at 182-83.
75. Id. at 184.
76. 15 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1940).
77. Id. at 649.
78. Id. at 651-52.
79. Id. at 651. The court's opinion was a telling precursor to the court's opinion, more
than sixty seven years later, in Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924
A.2d 447 (N.J. 2007). Specifically, the Borough in Gallenthin argued that a subsequent
amendment to New Jersey's constitutions, see infra Part II, divested the judiciary of the
authority to determine which uses were public uses for the purposes of eminent domain.
Gallenthin,924 A.2d at 456. The court rejected that argument. Id. Similarly, in Ryan the court
stated that "in the ultimate analysis it is a judicial question whether the use is 'public' in
nature." 15 A.2d at 650.
80. Ryan,15 A.2d at 650.
81. Id. at 652 (citing 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch. 19, § 9, 1938 N.J. Laws
75). Thus, it appears that the court believed that the constitutionality of the LHAL was saved,
in part, by the fact that the property would not be taken for the making of a profit.
82. Romano v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 10 A.2d 181, 183 (N.J. 1939).
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83
federal funds designated for slum clearance and public housing initiatives.
These programs often had a salutary effect on their communities without
controversy from property owners. 84 In Camden, for example, the Housing
Authority obtained more than $2 million in federal funds to construct
moderate-income housing in 1933, which directly benefited many Camden
residents.85
However, the LHAL was very limited in scope. Unlike modem
redevelopment statues, it was directed to the particular problem of insanitary
housing conditions for low-income people.86 The primarily goal of the
LHAL was to provide safe housing for the poor.87 Redevelopment was
incidental to this aim. The LHAL also lacked a key element that
characterizes modem redevelopment statutes. Although the LHAL vested
local Housing Authorities with the power to take private property for slum
clearance,8 8 the LHAL did not authorize the taking of private property for
private redevelopment.8 9 Indeed, the housing projects were publicly owned
and operated, and the LHAL prohibited their operation for a profit. 90 This
would soon change, however.

83. Id. The court noted that as of 1939, the following authorities had obtained federal
funds: "Asbury Park, $675,000; Atlantic City, $1,855,000; Camden, $1,281,000; Elizabeth,
$4,094,000; Harrison, $993,000; Jersey City, $4,496,000; Long Branch, $546,000; Newark,
$11,835,000; North Bergen, $863,000; Perth Amboy, $1,145,000; Summit, $391,000;
Trenton, $2,429,000." Id.
84. See 400 Housing Units to Be Added Near PresentProjects,CAMDEN COURIER POST,
Feb. 6, 1950, available at http://www.dvrbs.com/hacc/CamdenNJ-HousingAuthority.htm
(discussing success of early projects in Camden).
85. See HOUSING IN CAMDEN, supra note 63.
86. See 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch. 19, § 3, 1938 N.J. Laws 65 (declaring
that the purpose of the LHAL was to alleviate "unsanitary and unsafe dwelling
accommodations .... ).
87. See id. (declaring that LHAL was intended to provide safe and sanitary
accommodations for "persons of low income").
88. 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch. 19, § 8(d), 1938 N.J. Laws 74.
89. Id. (describing powers of housing authorities and specifically prohibiting authorities
from operating housing projects at a profit).
90. This is not to suggest that the power of eminent domain was never before delegated
to private entities or individuals. On the contrary, New Jersey's 1844 Constitution
contemplated such delegation. See art. IV. § 7, para. 9 ("Individuals or private corporations
shall not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first
made to the owners."); Glazier v. New Jersey & N.Y.R. Co., 37 A. 614, 615 (N.J. 1897)
(involving delegation of eminent domain authority to private railroad company). However,
this delegation had no early application to redevelopment projects.
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C. The 1944 Redevelopment Companies Law and the 1946 Urban
Redevelopment Law
New Jersey's experience with redevelopment took a significant turn with
the legislature's enactment of the 1944 Redevelopment Companies Law
("RCL") 91 and the 1946 Urban Redevelopment Law ("URL").9 2 Unlike the
LHAL, which was directed towards the specific problem of insanitary
housing, 93 the RCL was concerned with the more general problem of urban
decay. 94 Indeed, the legislature's statement declared that "in certain areas of
municipalities located within this State there exists substandard conditions..
. owing to obsolescence, deterioration and dilapidation of buildings, or
excessive land coverage, lack of planning, of public facilities, of sufficient
light, air and space, and improper design and arrangement of living
quarters., 95 The legislature concluded that these conditions "depress and
destroy the economic value of large areas and by impairing the value of
private investments threaten the sources of public revenue" and that
"rehabilitation" and "modernization" of these areas was "essential to the
protection of the financial stability of' the municipalities.9 6 Thus, the public
detriment targeted by the RCL was the financial insolvency of
municipalities.9 7
Significantly, the RCL also departed from the LHAL because it
intentionally authorized the solicitation and use of private capital to fund
redevelopment. 98 The RCL stated that "the reclamation or rehabilitation of
our centers of population cannot be carried out with public revenue or funds
alone and that private capital and enterprise must be enlisted if the very
essential task of reclamation and rehabilitation is to be discharged." 99 Under
the LHAL, on the other hand, redevelopment was entirely dependent on
public financing.'00
91. 1944 Redevelopment Companies Law, ch. 169, 1944 N.J. Laws 613.
92. 1946 Urban Redevelopment Law, ch. 52, 1946 N.J. Laws 109.
93. See 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch. 19, § 3, 1938 N.J. Laws 65 (declaring
that the purpose of the LHAL was to alleviate "unsanitary and unsafe dwelling
accommodations").
94. See 1944 Redevelopment Companies Law, ch. 169, § 2, 1944 N.J. Laws 615.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.at 616.
99.
Id.
100. See 1938 Local Housing Authorities Law, ch. 19, § 13, 1938 N.J. Laws 77
(authorizing the issuance of bonds to fmance public housing).
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The RCL also departed from the LHAL by authorizing the creation of
"Redevelopment Companies" by three or more private individuals, who
simply needed to file a certificate with the appropriate county clerk.' 01
Redevelopment Companies were deemed "quasi-public" in nature, were
subject to taxation, and were intended to operate for profit. 0 2 Unlike the
LHAL, which authorized redevelopment only for low-income public
housing, the RCL authorized redevelopment "for business, commercial,
03
industrial, cultural or recreational purposes.'
The RCL attempted to synchronize the private and public aspects of
redevelopment by authorizing Redevelopment Companies to adopt
redevelopment plans.' 0 4 These plans were then offered for public comment
and considered by a supervising public agency, usually the governing
municipality. 0 5 If a municipality approved the redevelopment plan, the
municipality could condemn private property "needed or convenient for the
10 6
project" and then convey that property to the Redevelopment Company.
The RCL also authorized municipalities to grant tax exemptions for property
07
included in a redevelopment plan in order to encourage private investment.1
The URL broadened New Jersey's redevelopment efforts even further.
The URL authorized any private entity or person to submit an application to
a municipality for the private construction and operation of sanitary housing
upon land located within the municipality that contained in whole or in part
unsanitary or unsafe structures. 10 8 If the municipality approved the
redevelopment application, the municipality was then authorized to acquire
"by the exercise of eminent domain, all of the property included within the
said tract of land" and lease the acquired property to the private developer for
a period of forty years with a right to renew for twenty years.' 0 9 The URL

101. Id. § 4,1944 N.J. Laws 620.
102. Id. The Authorities were required to state in their certificate that they were
created to "serve a public purpose" and that they were subject to supervision and control of
public authorities. Id.at 621.
103. Id. § 14, 1944 N.J. Laws 627 ("The project or projects of any redevelopment
company shall be designed and used primarily for housing purposes but portions of the project
may be planned and used for business, commercial, industrial, cultural or recreational
purposes appurtenant thereto as approved in the project.").
104. Id. § 3(7) 1944 N.J. Laws 618.
105.
Id. § 15(n)(3), 1944 N.J. Laws 630.
106. See id.§ 20, 1944 N.J. Laws 634.
107. Id. § 26, 1944 N.J. Laws 641.
108.
1946 Urban Redevelopment Law, ch. 52, § 3 1946 N.J. Laws 110.
109. Id. § 5, 1946 N.J. Laws 112.

RUTGERS LA WJOURNVAL

[Vol. 40:451

0
also provided tax exemptions for buildings erected on the property."
Although the URL was limited to the construction of housing developments
on decadent properties, its express purpose was to privatize redevelopment
initiatives.11
The RCL and URL were bold initiatives that, at least in theory,
significantly expanded municipalities' redevelopment authority. Both
statutes were precursors to modem redevelopment statutes because they
sought to provide incentives for private investment in redevelopment projects
and authorized the use of eminent domain to facilitate private
redevelopment. 12 Notwithstanding these ambitious objectives, however, the
laws were completely ineffective at facilitating redevelopment. 113 Developers
were reluctant to invest in redevelopment projects because of the risk that
New Jersey's courts would declare the statutes unconstitutional. 14 This
concern effectively undermined these statutes and prompted a significant
constitutional revision that now frames the contemporary redevelopment
debate in New Jersey.

II. THE 1947 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND THE GENESIS OF THE
"BLIGHTED AREAS CLAUSE"

When the legislature enacted the LHAL, RCL, and URL, New Jersey's
constitution was silent on the issue of redevelopment." 5 Although the
110. See id. § 3, 1946 N.J. Laws 117.
111. See id. § 2, 1946 N.J. Laws 109.
112. See id. at 110 ("[T]hat to accomplish such purpose investment of private capital
and participation by private enterprise should be encouraged."); 1944 Redevelopment
Companies Law, ch. 169, § 2, 1944 N.J. Laws 614. ("[T]hat provision must be made to
encourage the investment of funds.").
113. See I STATE OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947: CONVENTION
PROCEEDINGS REcoRD 743-44 (1952) [herinafter I PROCEEDINGS] ("No corporations have been
willing, so far, to undertake such projects with the fear of the law's being held
unconstitutional hanging over their head."). Corporations also feared that the RCL's tax
exemption provisions would be declared unconstitutional. Id.
114.
Id. This fear was not unfounded. Indeed, in Ryan v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 15
A.2d 647 (N.J. 1940), the court stated that it was upholding the constitutionality of the LHAL,
at least in part, because the LHAL prohibited the taking of private property to be operated by
the municipality for a profit. Id. at 652.
115.
However, the constitution, ratified in 1844, contained three provisions directly
addressing the taking of private property. First, the constitution provided that "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." N.J. CONST. OF 1844,
art. I, para. 16. Second, it endorsed the taking of private property for public schools. Id. art.
IV, § 7, para. 6. Third, and perhaps most surprisingly, the constitution provided that
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constitution contemplated the taking of private property for public use, the
only public use that it expressly identified was the taking of property for
public schools. 1 6 Thus, New Jersey's courts were responsible for deciding
which uses were constitutional. 1 7 This created a great deal of uncertainly
regarding the constitutionality of the RCL and URL, which boldly declared
that private redevelopment was a "public" use justifying the use of eminent
domain.' 1 8 Indeed, before 1947, not a single corporation invested in a New
Jersey redevelopment project. 1 9 Thus, when Governor Alfred E. Driscoll
successfully convened a constitutional convention in 1947120 a prime issue
for the delegates was whether the new constitution should expressly address
redevelopment.
A. The Committee on the Legislative Rejects a ConstitutionalProvision
Addressing Redevelopment
The Committee on the Legislative, which was charged with drafting a
Legislative Article for the new constitution,121 was the first to discuss a
constitutional provision dealing with redevelopment. 22 Mr. Ernest G. Fifield,

"[ilndividuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property for
public use without just compensation first made to the owners." Id. art. IV, § 7, para. 9.
116. Id. art. IV, § 7, para. 6.
117. See Ryan v. Housing Authority of Newark, 15 A.2d 647, 650 (N.J. 1940); TideWater Co. v. Coster, 18 N.J. Eq. 518 (N.J. 1866) (affirming that the judiciary was responsible
for revisiting the legislature's declarations of public use).
118. See Holcombe v. W. Union Tel. Co., 162 A. 760, 762 (N.J. 1932) (stating that no
authority exists to take property except for public use); I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 113, at
743-44 ("No corporations have been willing, so far, to undertake such projects with the fear of
the law's being held unconstitutional hanging over their head.").
119.
I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 113, at 744.
It is possible, of course, that these laws would not be declared unconstitutional, but no
business corporation wants to be the guinea pig and sink large sums into a project
without assurance that it will be safe in its investments. The result is that while this
program of rehabilitation has been endorsed by the Legislature twice, no
redevelopment is being undertaken in the State, even now when the acute housing
shortage would make it an attractive venture to capital.
Id.
120. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 15-16 (1990).
121.
II STATE OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947: CONVENTION
PROCEEDINGS RECORD 1061 (1952) [hereinafter II PROCEEDINGS].
122. III STATE OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947: CONVENTION
PROCEEDINGS RECORD 537 (1952) [hereinafter III PROCEEDINGS].
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a representative of the Montclair Planning
Board, initially proposed a
123
constitutional provision to the committee.
Mr. Fifield's proposed provision stated that the
acquisition of real property for development or redevelopment of any
area in accordance with a plan duly adopted in a manner prescribed by
the Legislature, whether the uses to which such area is to be devoted2 4 be
public or private uses or both, is hereby declared to be a public use.'
The provision also stated that the legislature could authorize
municipalities to exempt redevelopment improvements from taxation and
create redevelopment authorities or corporations. 125 Notably, the proposal did
not expressly define or describe the types of property that could be
redeveloped. 126 Rather, the proposal stated that the "[1]egislature shall
make
127
laws governing the acquisition, use and disposal of such property."'
Mr. Fifield explained that the provision was necessary because "blighted
areas" within "older towns and cities" were "dangerous not only to the area
themselves, but to property values throughout the town or city," and "the
police power of the municipalities [was] not ... sufficient to stop the spread
of this deterioration. ' 128 The result, according to Mr. Fifield, was that many
municipalities were spending more money on services for these areas than

123. Id. at 538. For the Montclair Planning Board's written proposal see id. at 860.
There was also a written proposal by the New Jersey Federation of Official Planning Boards
which was essentially the same as the Montclair planning board's proposal. Id. at 880.
124. Id. at 544.
125. Id. The complete text of the proposed provision was as follows:
The acquisition of real property for development or redevelopment of any area in
accordance with a plan duly adopted in a manner prescribed by the Legislature,
whether the uses to which such area is to be devoted be public or private uses or both,
is hereby declared to be a public use. The Legislature shall make laws governing
acquisition, use and disposal of such property by an agency of the State or a political
subdivision thereof. The Legislature may authorize the organization of corporations
or authorities to undertake such development or redevelopment or any part thereof
and may authorize municipalities to exempt their improvements from taxation, in
whole or in part, for a limited period of time, under conditions as to special public
regulations to be specified by law or by contract between any such corporation or
authority and the municipality, provided that during the period of such tax exemption
the profits of the corporation and the dividends paid by it shall be limited by law.
Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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they could
collect in ratables, which created an unsustainable financial
29
situation.1
Mr. Fifield's proposed solution was "to tear down some of these
neighborhoods, assemble them by the exercise of the power of eminent
domain and rebuild them through private capital or public funds into a wellplanned neighborhood."' 13 Mr. Fifield further explained that it was necessary
for the new constitution to include a provision stating that "the clearing out
of blighted areas which are a damaging influence in the development of the
town and its proper plan constitute a public purpose . . ." and that although
"[t]he highest courts of Illinois and New York have declared that [the
removal of blight] is a public purpose," it was essential that the new
constitution contain an "express provision" authorizing this type of
redevelopment in order to eliminate any doubt regarding its
constitutionality. 131
Not surprisingly, the Committee was concerned that Mr. Fifield's
proposal could lead to a "great deal" of abuse regarding private property
rights. 132 Concerned citizens also made submissions in opposition to the
proposal, claiming that the proposal was "socialistic in the extreme" and
threatened to "bring about a further centralization of power and control over
private property."'' 33 Municipalities responded to those allegations by stating
that "private property must always be subordinated to public uses" 134 and
that redevelopment was "essential" to the public welfare.135 However, the
Committee was apparently unconvinced by the municipalities' presentation
136
and it did not include the proposed clause in its draft Legislative Article.
B. The Convention Adopts a Redevelopment Provision
The proposal, with at least one significant variation, was revived by
delegate Jane Barus as an amendment to the Article on Taxation and

129. Id.
130. Id.at 545.
131. Id.
132. Id.at 546.
133. Id.at 806 (quoting a letter from A. Thornton Bishop to Committee on the
Legislative); see also id.at 547 (presenting the letter to the Committing on the Legislative).
134. Id.at 548. The Montclair town planner also submitted a reply letter. Id.at 804.
135. Id.at 804-05.
136. II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 121, at 1078 (citing the committee report to the
convention).
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Finance. 37 Ms. Barus brought the proposed amendment to the convention as
a whole.' 38 Ms. Barus reiterated the municipalities' position that the power of
eminent domain and tax exemption was necessary to curb the spread of
urban blight and the financial impact of blight on local municipalities. 139 Ms.
137. Ms. Barus initially moved the Convention to amend the Legislative Article to
include the "blighted areas clause" but was apparently convinced by Senator O'Mara,
Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative, that the clause was more appropriate under the
Article on Taxation and Finance. I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 113, at 420. Ms. Barus
subsequently reintroduced the amendment per Senator O'Mara's suggestion. Id. at 742.
Curiously, the language of Ms. Barus' proposed amendment to the Legislative Article differs
significantly from the proposal that she ultimately presented to the Convention as an
amendment to the Article on Taxation and Finance and which now appears as Article VII, § 3,
para. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. See II PROCEEDINGS supra note 121, at 1094, amend.
13 (listing Ms. Barus' initial proposal to the Convention as amendment to the Legislative
Article); id. at 1245, amend. 14 (listing Ms. Barus' revised proposal to the Convention as
amendment to the Article on Taxation and Finance). Ms. Barus' original proposal to the
Convention was identical to the language proposed to the Committee on the Legislative by
Mr. Ernest G. Fifield and the Montclair Planning Board. See supra note 125 and
accompanying text (discussing Mr. Fifield's proposal to the Committee on the Legislative).
The Convention Proceedings Record contains no explanation regarding the changes that Ms.
Barus made to the proposal before reintroducing it in the form that the Convention ultimately
adopted.
138. I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 113, at 420 (noting that the initial presentation as an
amendment to the Legislative Article that was withdrawn); id. at 742 (noting the ultimate
presentation as an amendment to the Article on Taxation and Finance).
139. Id. at 742-743. Ms. Barus described the problem as follows:
The older cities in the State, in common with most older cities everywhere, I
imagine, have been facing an increasingly difficult situation as the years advance.
Certain sections of those cities have fallen in value, and have became what is known
as "blighted" or "depressed" areas. This has happened, sometimes, because the
population has shifted from one part of the town to another, or one section has
become overcrowded. Sometimes it has happened because the district has turned to
business instead of residential, or partly to business; and sometimes simply because
the buildings themselves, although they were originally good and may have been fine
homes, have become so outdated and obsolescent that they are no longer desirable,
and hence, no longer profitable.
These depressed areas go steadily down hill. The original occupants move away,
the rents fall, landlords lose income and they make up for it by taking in more
families per house. It's impossible to keep the properties in good condition, the
houses deteriorate more and more, and what was once a good section of the town is
on the way to becoming a slum.
Naturally, this slump in value is not confined to the original area affected. It
spreads to neighboring blocks. No one person, no house owner or landlord in this
neighborhood, can counteract this spread, because no one can afford to sink money
into a blighted area. Even if one or two of the houses are modernized, the money is
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Barus emphasized that private capital was essential to successful
redevelopment." 40 A constitutional provision was necessary, therefore,
because although urban "rehabilitation ha[d] been endorsed by the legislature
twice, no redevelopment [was] undertaken in the State.' 41 Ms. Barus noted
that "no business corporation wants to be the guinea pig and sink large sums
into a project without assurance that it will be safe in its investments.' 4 2
According to Ms. Barus, the proposed amendment would "remove this fear
and would make possible a program of rehabilitation of our cities. '1 43 Ms.
Barus emphasized that the proposed amendment would apply to "only
certain cities" and "would not affect any community where it would not be
useful."'144
Ms. Barus's proposed language differed from Mr. Fifield's proposal in
one significant respect. Mr.Fifield's proposal did not describe the kind of
property that was subject to redevelopment and expressly delegated
responsibility for that determination to the legislature. 145 However, Ms.
Barus's proposal stated that the "clearance, replanning, development or
redevelopment of blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for
which private property may be taken or acquired" and that "such clearance,
146
replanning, development or redevelopment" may "be authorized by law.'
Thus, based on the text alone, Ms. Barus's proposal appeared to limit
redevelopment to "blighted areas."
However, there is no evidence in the convention proceedings record that
the delegates discussed whether the Amendment was intended to limit
redevelopment to only "blighted areas" or whether the Amendment was
intended to delegate authority for defining the meaning of "blighted areas" to
the legislature. Unlike the testy debate that occurred in the Committee on the
Legislative, Ms. Barns' proposal was not the subject of significant

thrown away and nothing is gained, because the improvement is so small that it
cannot turn the tide of deterioration. The only way in which the section can be
rehabilitated is by a complete rebuilding of a whole neighborhood. But, naturally, that
is an extremely expensive matter and one which is not attractive to capital.
Id.
140. Id.at 743.
141. Id.at 744 (referring to the RCL and the URL).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.at 742.
145. Id.at 860; see also supra,notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
146. II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 121, at 1245 (emphasis added).
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controversy among the delegates. 147 The amendment, which is now known as
48
the "blighted areas clause" was approved by a majority of the delegates1
and the constitution was ratified by an overwhelming majority of the
public. 149 The provision remains in effect and has not been amended since it
was adopted in 1947.
III. THE PERCEPTION OF PLENARY LEGISLATIVE REDEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY AFTER 1947
The convention's adoption of the blighted areas clause was a turning
point for redevelopment in New Jersey. Prior to 1947, redevelopment
initiatives were entirely unsuccessful at attracting private capital because of
uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of private redevelopment. 5 0 The
blighted areas clause was intended to remove any doubt in that regard, and,
consequently, encourage significant redevelopment. 51 However, latent in the
blighted areas clause was an ambiguity that seriously threatened property
owners' rights and resulted in a highly deferential standard of review after
1947.
A. The Blighted Areas Clause as a Grant of PlenaryRedevelopment
Authority
The Convention clearly intended the blighted areas clause to resolve any
uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of redevelopment laws such as the
RCL152 and the URL.'5 3 Viewed within this context, the blighted areas clause
could reasonably be understood as a constitutional sanction of those laws

147.
I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 113, at 742-45. In fact, the only comment on the
provision was from Senator O'Mara, who seconded Ms. Barus's proposed amendment. Id. at
744. Senator O'Mara concurred that private capital was necessary for redevelopment of New
Jersey's older cities and that a constitutional amendment was necessary to give investors
confidence in New Jersey's redevelopment legislation. Id. at 744-45.
Although the convention record does not reveal the exact vote, the amendment
148.
was not passed unanimously. Id. at 745.
149. WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 16.
150. See discussion supraPart II.
151. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II (discussing
the direct importance of the RCL in the adoption of the blighted areas clause).
153. See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II
(discussing the direct importance of the URL in the adoption of the blighted areas clause).
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and, therefore, not the source of any property right protections. 154 Indeed, the
blighted areas clause is best viewed as a constitutional declaration that a
property owner's "bundle of rights"' 55 does not include the right to withhold
property from government taking if the government determines that the
property is blighted. 156 More important, however, because the blighted areas
clause authorized the legislature to pass implementing legislation, the Clause
could reasonably be
understood to vest the legislature with plenary authority
' 57
to define "blight."'
154. Indeed, this was exactly the position that the Borough of Paulsboro and several
amici curiae took before the New Jersey Supreme Court in Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 456 (N.J.
2007); Brief for New Jersey State League of Municipalities, Downtown New Jersey, Inc. and
New Jersey Chapter-American Planning Ass'n as Amici Curiae at 9, Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at
447 (N.J. 2007) (No. A-51).
155. See, e.g., David Schultz, Scalia, Property, and Dolan v. Tigard, 29 AKRON L.
REV. 1, 12 (1995) (explaining the oft used metaphor of property ownership as a "bundle of
rights").
156. Because state legislatures are presumed to have plenary law-making authority
restricted only by federal preemption and conflicting individual rights provisions, see Client
Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 390 N.E.2d 847, 849-50 (I11. 1979), an express delegation of
redevelopment authority to the Legislature was presumably unnecessary. See Wilson v. City
of Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837, 842-43 (N.J. 1958) (suggesting that authority to engage in
redevelopment is arguably within the state's police power and no additional authorization is
necessary).
Thus, the precise constitutional question that most jeopardized earlier redevelopment
statutes such as the RCL and URL was not whether the Legislature was authorized to enact
redevelopment legislation in furtherance of the public welfare, but whether such legislation
conflicted with the scope of property rights protected by New Jersey's constitution, i.e. the
constitutional guarantee that property be taken only for "public use." See N.J. CONST. art. I.,
para. 20; see also Wilson, 142 A.2d at 842-53 (explaining that the blighted areas clause was
intended to address the apparent conflict between the scope of property rights and the state's
police power).
The blighted areas clause was intended to resolve any uncertainty regarding the
constitutionality of redevelopment by affirmatively limiting property rights in the context of
redevelopment. In this sense, the blighted areas clause was a delegation of authority by the
People, who presumably had the right to resist the taking of their property for redevelopment
purposes, to the Legislature, which now had authority to take property to redevelop "blighted
areas." See Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 456 (characterizing the blighted areas clause as a "trust"
created by the "People," with the Legislature acting as trustee).
157. The blighted areas clause declares that the redevelopment of blighted areas is a
public use for which the Legislature can exercise its powers of eminent domain and that the
Legislature can delegate that authority to municipalities. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 1.
The clause also includes two other express grants of legislative authority. The clause
authorizes the Legislature to: 1) permit "municipal, public or private corporations . . . to
undertake" the "clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment of blighted areas;" and
2) to regulate the "conditions of use, ownership, management and control of such
improvements" incident to redevelopment projects. Id.
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In that event, the legislature's redevelopment authority would be
restricted only by other relevant provisions of the constitution, such as the
just compensation clause' 58 and due process principles. 159 This understanding
of the blighted areas clause is not inconsistent with the provision's history' 60
and is reasonably consistent with the provision's language.' 16 However, it
poses an obvious risk to property owners because the only check on the
legislature's authority to define the scope of redevelopment would be
procedural due process principles. Stated differently, if a property satisfies
the statutory definition of "blight," the owner could not challenge the taking
of the property by arguing that the property was not "blighted" in a
constitutional sense. 62 Despite this obvious opportunity for abuse by
municipalities and the legislature, this expansive interpretation of the
blighted areas clause characterized redevelopment statutes and judicial
review of these statutes after 1947.163
B. The Legislature'sAssumed Authority to Define "Blight" andProgressive
Expansion of the Scope of Redevelopment
Almost immediately after the blighted areas clause was adopted, 164 the
legislature assumed authority for defining the term "blighted area," and
based on its presumed plenary authority, has progressively expanded the
scope of redevelopment. In 1949, the legislature enacted the Blighted Areas
N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20.
The New Jersey Constitution does not contain an express due process guarantee.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 31. However, New Jersey's courts have long recognized that
due process is an implicit constitutional guarantee of N.J. CONST. art. I. para. 1, which
provides that all individuals posses certain "unalienable rights". See Nicoletta v. North Jersey
Dist. Water Supply Comm., 390 A.2d 90, 97 (N.J. 1978) (finding due process guarantees
implicit in article one, paragraph one); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 31-32.
160. See supraPart H (discussing the provision's history).
161.
See supra note 157 (discussing express delegation of legislative authority in the
blighted areas clause).
162.
This was the argument advanced by the Borough of Paulsboro and various amicus
curiae in Gallenthin.See Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro,924 A.2d 447,
456 (N.J. 2007) (summarizing the Borough of Paulsboro's position); Amici Brief, supra, note
154, at 6; see also Levin v. Twp Comm. of Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. 1971) (stating
that if property fits statutory criteria for blight that determination is "unassailable").
See, e.g., Levin 274 A.2d at 3 (stating that if property fits statutory criteria for
163.
blight that determination is "unassailable"); see also Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 142 A.2d
837, 855 (N.J. 1958).
164. The 1947 Constitution, which contained the blighted areas clause, was ratified by
popular vote in 1948. WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 17.
158.
159.
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Act ("BAA"), 6 5 which was the first redevelopment statute under New
Jersey's new Constitution and the blighted areas clause. The preface to the
' 166
BAA declared that the BAA was "[a]n Act defining 'blighted area.'
The BAA defined "blighted area" as an area "wherein there exist[ed] to a
large extent:" (a) structures unfit for human habitation; (b) structures
configured and "used as to have therein more inhabitants than can be fitly
and safely housed;" (c) "a disproportion between the cost of municipal
services rendered to the area as compared with the tax revenue derived
therefrom;" or (d) a "prevalence of factors conducive to ill health,
transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, crime and
poverty., 167 The BAA also established procedures for municipalities to
follow when declaring an area blighted, including public notice and
hearings, 168 and authorized municipalities to take blighted property by
eminent domain for redevelopment by a "private corporation" pursuant to the
RCL and URL. 169 The BAA clearly evidenced the legislature's belief that the
blighted areas clause authorized the legislature to define the term "blighted
area" and, consequently, the0 type of properties that could be redeveloped or
7
taken by eminent domain. 1
The legislature amended its definition of "blighted area" twice between
1949 and 1986.'71 In 1951, the legislature significantly expanded the
definition by declaring that blighted areas included:
Unimproved vacant land, which has remained so for a period of ten
years... and which land by reason of its location, or remoteness from
developed sections or portions of such municipality, or lack of means of
access to such other parts thereof, or topography, or nature of the soil, is
not likely to be developed through the instrumentality of private capital.
,,172

165. See 1949 Blighted Areas Act, ch. 187, § 1, 1949 N.J. Laws 626 (defining
"blighted area").
166. Id.preface, 1949 N.J. Laws 626.
167. Id.§ 1, 1949 N.J. Laws 626.
168. Id.§§ 2-9, 1949 N.J. Laws 626-29.
169. Id.§ 10, 1949 N.J. Laws 629.
170. Id. preface, 1949 N.J. Laws 626 (granting authority of eminent domain for
redevelopment of "blighted areas" pursuant to the blighted areas clause); Id. § 1, 1949 N.J.
Laws 626 (defining "blighted areas").
171.
For a review of all amendments to New Jersey's statutes defining "blight" from
1947 until 1992, see Reforming Eminent Domain in New Jersey, supra note 2, at 10-13; see
also Forbes v. Bd. of Trustees of South Orange, 712 A.2d 255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998).
172. Act of May 29, 1949, ch. 248, § 1(c), 1951 N.J. Laws 865; see Forbes, 712 A.2d
at 257-58 (stating the 1951 amendment expanded the definition of "blight").
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The legislature further defined "blighted areas" to include "[a] growing lack
of proper utilization of areas caused by the condition of the title, diverse
ownership of the real property therein and other conditions, resulting in a
stagnant and unproductive condition of land potentially useful and valuable
for contributing to and serving the public health, safety and welfare., 173 In
1986, the legislature included in its definition of "blighted areas" areas in
"excess of 10 contiguous acres, whereon buildings or improvements have
been destroyed, consumed by fire, demolished or altered by the action of
storm, fire, cyclone, tornado, earthquake or other casualty in such a way that
' 74
the aggregate assessed value of the area has been materially depreciated.'
These amendments greatly expanded the definition of blight from its original
description in the BAA and confirm the legislature's perception that the
blighted areas clause gave it plenary, or at least expansive, authority to
define the meaning of blight and the scope of redevelopment. 175
In 1992, the legislature enacted New Jersey's current redevelopment
statute, the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law ("LRHL"), 176 which
repealed and replaced the BAA, URL, and RCL. 177 The LRHL was a bold
expansion of municipal redevelopment authority.178 Indeed, the LRHL
dispensed with the constitutional term "blighted areas" and replaced it with
the phrase "in need of redevelopment."1 79 The legislature decreed that "[a]n
area determined to be in need of redevelopment pursuant to this section shall
be deemed to be a 'blighted80 area' for the purposes of [the blighted areas
clause] of the Constitution.' '
The LRHL also significantly enlarged the scope of redevelopment by
modifying the definition of "in need of redevelopment" to include areas
where there exists lack of proper utilization "because of conditions of title,
173. Act of May 29, 1949, ch. 248, § 1(e), 1951 N.J. Laws 866.
174. Act of Nov. 17, 1986, ch. 151, § l(f), 1986 N.J. Laws 821.
175. It should be noted that in 1985 the Legislature added an additional category to its
definition of blight, criterion (g), Act of Jan. 13, 1986, ch. 435, § 1, 1985 N.J. Laws 1811,
which provides for redevelopment in "Urban Enterprise Zones".
176. 1992 Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, ch. 79, 1992 N.J. Laws 784
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:12A-1, et seq. (West 2008)).
177. See id. §§ 56(a), 59, 1992 N.J. Laws 838, 843 (listing all legislation repealed by
LRHL) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-55 (West 2008)).
178. See Reforming Eminent Domain in New Jersey, supra note 2, at 10-13 (describing
the legislature's expansion of the definition of the term "blight").
1992 Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, ch. 79, § 5, 1992 N.J. Laws 789
179.
(codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A: 12A-5 (West 2008)). But see Forbes v. City of Long
Branch, 712 A.2d 255, 259 (N.J. 1998) (stating that change in phrase was "cosmetic only").
1992 Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, ch. 79, § 6, 1992 N.J. Laws 791
180.
(codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-6 (West 2008)).
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diverse ownership of real property therein or other conditions, resulting in a
stagnant or not fully productive condition of land.' 8 ' This provision was
significantly broader than the Blighted Areas Act because, on its face, it
appeared to authorize redevelopment82 of any area that was not fully
productive for any reason whatsoever.1
The legislature's steady expansion of the scope of redevelopment
following the adoption of the blighted areas clause demonstrates that the
legislature believed that the blighted areas clause gave it plenary authority
for defining "blighted areas." Indeed, the legislature expressly declared in the
LRHL that the constitutional term "blighted areas" was to be understood as
synonymous with
its broad definition of the term "in need of
83
redevelopment."
C. JudicialReview of Redevelopment Legislation Under the Blighted Areas
Clause
Judicial review of redevelopment legislation after 1947 was also
characterized by the perception that the legislature possessed plenary power
to define the scope of redevelopment by broadly defining "blighted areas.' 8 4
Courts repeatedly upheld redevelopment designations without questioning
whether the ever-mutating statutory criteria fairly defined "blight" within the

181.
1992 Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, ch. 79, § 5, 1992 N.J. Laws 789
(codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A: 12A-5(e) (West 2008)). This was the provision at issue in
GallenthinRealty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro,924 A.2d 447 (N.J. 2007).
182. See Reforming Eminent Domain in New Jersey, supra note 2, at xvii (discussing
how this provision represented a significant expansion of the Legislature's prior definition of
the term blight). Indeed, this expansive interpretation of subsection 5(e) was the interpretation
adopted by the Borough of Paulsboro in Gallenthin. See infra Part V.A.1 (discussing
Paulsboro's interpretation of subsection 5(e) in Gallenthin). Paulsboro argued that the phrase
"or other conditions" should be interpreted to mean "any other conditions." See infra Part
V.A.1. Paulsboro also argued that the property need not be stagnant because the phrase
"stagnant or not fully productive" should be interpreted to require only that the property be
"not fully productive." See infra Part V.A. 1. Although the court in Gallenthin held that this
interpretation was not correct because it would render the statute unconstitutional, Paulsboro's
interpretation of the statute's language is certainly reasonable and, in fact, supported by at
least some of the legislative history. See Reforming Eminent Domain in New Jersey, supra
note 2, at xvii.
183.
1992 Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, ch. 79, § 6, 1992 N.J. Laws 791
(codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A: 12A-6 (West 2008)).
184. See, e.g., Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 19 (N.J. 1971);
Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837, 837 (N.J. 1958); Forbes v. Bd. of Trustees of
South Orange, 712 A.2d 255, 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
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meaning of the blighted areas clause. 85 The case that set the tone for this
analysis 186
was the supreme court's 1958 decision in Wilson v. City of Long
Branch.

In Wilson, several property owners challenged the City of Long Branch's
designation of their property as "blighted" under the 1951 amendments to the
BAA. 187 The property owners argued that the BAA was unconstitutional
because the authority to define "blighted areas" resides "in the judicial and
not the legislative branch of the government."'' 8 8 In a scolding retort to this
argument, Justice Francis wrote:
This is entirely specious. The [blighted areas clause] declares that
redevelopment of "blighted" areas shall be a public purpose and
authorizes the Legislature to empower municipal governments to
undertake such redevelopment. Manifestly, the grant of power
contemplated development and implementation by the Legislature.
Definition of blight was the ordinary and expected incident of the
exercise of that power and no reasonable argument can be made that the
connotation ascribed to it overreaches
the public purpose sought to be
89
promoted by the Constitution.
Although the court did not foreclose the possibility that a different
statutory definition of blight could "overreach" the constitutional meaning of
that term, the court's ringing endorsement of redevelopment legislation'9" set

185. See e.g., Levin, 274 A.2d at 3 (stating that if property fits statutory criteria for
blight that determination is "unassailable").
186. 142 A.2d 837 (N.J. 1958).
187. Id.at 841.
188. Id. at 849. The property owners advanced seven other constitutional arguments
challenging the validity of the BAA. See id.at 843-49. Among these was the argument that the
taking of property for redevelopment by another private entity violated the New Jersey and
Federal Constitutions. Id. at 846. The court properly dispensed with this argument by noting
that this was the precise reason that the Convention adopted the blighted areas clause. Id.
189. Id.at 849.
190. Id. In a separate portion of the court's opinion, Justice Francis wrote this broad
endorsement of the policies underlying redevelopment:
Community redevelopment is a modem facet of municipal government. Soundly
planned redevelopment can make the difference between continued stagnation and
decline and a resurgence of healthy growth. It provides the means of removing the
decadent effect of slums and blight on neighboring property values, of opening up
new areas for residence and industry. In recent years, recognition has grown that
governing bodies must either plan for the development or redevelopment of urban
areas or permit them to become more congested, deteriorated, obsolescent, unhealthy,

stagnant, inefficient and costly.
Id.at 842.
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the tone for the next several decades of judicial review of redevelopment
statutes-namely, judicial acquiescence to the legislature's presumed
prerogative to define the contours and scope of redevelopment in New
Jersey. 191
For example, in Property Owners ProtectiveAss "n,
Etc. v. City Council
of Jersey City, 192 which the court decided eleven years after Wilson, the court
considered whether Jersey City could properly declare airspace to be a
"blighted area."'193 The dispute arose when the city designated the airspace
above a set of below-street-level railroad tracks as "blighted" in order to
facilitate commercial development at street level and protect against further
deterioration of the surrounding area.' 94 Although the court engaged in a
sophisticated analysis of the BAA's text, history, and structure to determine
whether the redevelopment of airspace was consistent with the legislature's
enactment of the BAA, it did not even address whether airspace was a
"blighted area" within the meaning of the blighted areas clause. 195 The
court's analysis implied that the blighted areas clause does' 96
not impose an
independent outer limit on the statutory definition of "blight."'
Justice Francis also suggested that the state likely possesses the authority to take property
for private redevelopment by virtue of its plenary police power and that the blighted areas
clause may have been an unnecessary precaution by the Convention. Id.at 843. The totality of
the court's opinion, therefore, was a forceful and all-encompassing endorsement of
redevelopment and the Legislature's authority the pass laws in furtherance thereof.
191.
See, e.g., Lyons v. City of Camden, 226 A.2d 625, 632 (N.J. 1967) (stating the
constitutionality of the BAA's definition of blight was disposed of in its entirety in Wilson
"and there is no need to review the matter again."); Paramus Multiplex Corp. v. Hartz
Mountain Indus., Inc., 564 A.2d 146, 149-50 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) ("The
constitutionality of [the BAA] has long been recognized.") (citing Wilson, 142 A.2d at 837)).
Wilson was also significant in expanding the perceived scope of redevelopment authority
because the court held that "if the condition of the land involved meets the specifications of
any one of the five subsections" identified in the BAA, the finding of blight is "unassailable."
See Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. 1971) (citing Wilson, 142 A.2d
at 837).
192. 259 A.2d 698 (N.J. 1969).
193.
Id.at 701.
194. Id. The railroad tracks sat below street level and the railroad required only
twenty-three feet above ground level to operate. Id.The railroad company had expressed
interest in selling the space above the tracks to developers to construct buildings above the
tracks that would be accessible at street level. Id.
195. Id.at 704-07.
196. The court did mention the possibility that the taking of airspace could be
unconstitutional. Id.at 705. However, its analysis was peculiar. The court did not cite the
blighted areas clause, and certainly did not undergo an analysis of the blighted areas clause's
text, history or purpose. Id.The court simply stated: "The decisions rejecting various
constitutional attacks on urban renewal legislation have clearly recognized that it goes far
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Similarly, in Levin v. Township Committee of Bridgewater,97 the court
considered whether the Township of Bridgewater could designate 120 acres
of largely vacant rural land as "blighted."' 98 The court again engaged in a
thorough analysis of whether the redevelopment of rural, rather than urban,
areas was consistent with the legislature's enactment of the BAA,' 99 but
failed to conduct an independent constitutional analysis of whether such
redevelopment was within the scope of the blighted areas clause. 20 0 The lack
of any independent constitutional analysis under the blighted areas clause
further suggests that the judiciary perceived that the legislature possessed
plenary authority to define "blighted areas." Indeed, citing Wilson, the court
held that "[i]f the condition of the land involved meets the specifications of
any one of the five subsections [under the BBA's definition of blight,] the
finding of blight is unassailable."20 1
This presumption of plenary legislative authority was finally brought to
2 °2 Forbes,
light in Forbes v. Board of Trustees of South Orange.
involved a
2
°3
redevelopment designation under the 1992 LRHL, which removed the
term "blighted area" from the statutory scheme and replaced it with the
phrase "in need of redevelopment. ' '20 4 Perhaps alerted by this change in the
statute, the property owners challenged the application of the LRHL to their
property by arguing that the blighted areas clause imposed a perquisite blight
beyond the elimination of the perceptually offensive slums." Id. at 704 (citing Wilson, 142
A.2d at 837). The court then made reference to a New York case upholding redevelopment of
an area even though it was not a perceptually offensive slum to conclude there was no
constitutional issue implicated in the case. Id. at 705. The court's reliance on a case from a
foreign jurisdiction is strong evidence that its analysis was not based on the premise that the
blighted areas clause provided an independent limitation on the legislature's redevelopment
authority. Rather, the court seems to have perceived that a constitutional challenge to the BAA
implicated the scope of the State's police power.
197. 274 A.2d I (N.J. 1971).
198. Id. at 5. The 120 acres area had only eighteen or nineteen dwellings constructed
on it. Id.
199. Id. at 4-5.
200. The totality of the court's constitutional analysis was as follows: "Finally,
plaintiffs argue that subsection 21.1(e) of the statute is unconstitutional because it delegates
unbridled legislative power to the municipal agencies without setting out adequate standards
to guide and control the exercise of the power. We see no merit in the contention." Id. at 22
(citing Wilson 142 A.2d at 847).
201. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
202. 712 A.2d 255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
203.
1992 Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, ch. 79, 1992 N.J. Laws 784
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A: 12A-1 et seq. (West 2008)).
204. See supra Part III.B (discussing the adoption of the LRHL and its expansion of
the definition of "blighted areas").
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determination before the municipality could exercise its redevelopment and
eminent domain authority under the LRHL.0 5 Although the Appellate
Division upheld the Township's designation of the area as "in need of
redevelopment" under the LRHL,20 6 the panel perceptively noted that
notwithstanding Wilson's inference to the contrary, the "Constitution permits
the undertaking of public redevelopment only if the area so designated is
blighted., 20 7 Nevertheless, the panel concluded that the redevelopment
designation at issue did not offend the blighted areas clause.20 8
In many respects, Forbes was the precursor to Gallenthin because it
resurrected the notion that the blighted areas clause provided an outer limit
on the legislature's redevelopment authority, which had been all but lost in
the shadow of Wilson's broad endorsement of the BAA. Indeed, in Forbes,
the Appellate Division concluded, or at least acknowledged, that an
independent analysis of the constitutionality of the LRHL under the blighted
areas clause was appropriate. Notwithstanding the Appellate Division's
analysis in Forbes, it was not until Gallenthin that the blighted areas clause
would be properly recognized as a meaningful limitation on the legislature's
redevelopment authority.
IV. THE (IN)SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD AFTER 1947
Post-1947 judicial review of redevelopment designations was
characterized by another significant threat to property rights. Both the BAA
and the LRHL provided that municipal blight designations were entitled to
deference from a reviewing court if the municipality's designation was
supported by "substantial evidence" on the record. 20 9 However, as
205. Forbes, 712 A.2d at 257. The Appellate Division phrased the plaintiff's argument
thusly: "They claim that the present governing statute, [the LRHL], was misconstrued by
defendants as not requiring a prerequisite blight determination and that defendants proceeded
with their designation of the redevelopment area without meeting the blight standard." Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.at 260. The Appellate Division recognized that the supreme court's holding in
Wilson may be to the contrary. Citing Wilson with the introductory signal "cf", the panel
commented that Wilson suggests "that the police power alone may constitute adequate
authority for at least some types of redevelopment." Id.
208. Id.at 262.
209. See 1992 Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, ch. 79, § 6, 1992 N.J. Laws
791 (codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-6(b)(5) (West 2008)); Lyons v. Camden, 226
A.2d 625, 630 (N.J. 1967) (stating in regards to the BAA that "[t]he function of the Law
Division as prescribed by the statute is to decide whether the determination of the public body
is supported by substantial evidence.") (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-21.6 (West 2008)).
The LRHL and BAA also required a municipality to undertake an investigation before
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redevelopment initiatives proliferated, municipalities frequently made
redevelopment designations without adequate research, planning or
justification.1
In ERETC, L.L.C. v. City of Perth Amboy, 21' the City designated a
profitable and well-kept commercial building as "in need of redevelopment"
under the LRHL. 21 2 The building was sixty-five to seventy-five percent
occupied by tenants who were subject to long-term leases. 213 Three-hundred
forty-five individuals were employed in the building, and seventy-five to
eighty percent of those employees lived within a five to eight mile radius of
the building.1 4 The building was in excellent condition and the owner and
tenants had recently invested more than $300,000 in improvements to the
building. 1 5 Nevertheless, the city declared the building to be "in need of
redevelopment" based on a conclusory expert report that "merely recited the
[statutory] criteria in a conclusory fashion without tying it to the reasons the
properties should be included in the redevelopment area., 216 The expert
report was not based on a site investigation, tax records for the property, or
any "quantitative information. 21 7 Notwithstanding this record, the trial court

declaring an area in need of redevelopment. See 1992 Local Redevelopment and Housing
Law, ch. 79, § 6, 1992 N.J. Laws 791 (codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-6 (West
2008)); Act of May 21, 1949, ch. 187, § 2, 1949 N.J. Laws 626. This meant that once a
municipality made a redevelopment designation, the property owners bore the burden of
proving that it was not based on substantial evidence.
210. The facts in Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro,924 A.2d 447
(N.J. 2007) provide a good example of this problem. See also infra Part V.A (discussing the
facts in Gallenthin). The Borough of Paulsboro declared Gallenthin's property was "in need of
redevelopment" based on an expert report and the testimony of the Borough's planning expert.
Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 452. However, both the report and the planner's testimony simply
stated, in conclusory terms, that Gallenthin's property satisfied the statutory criteria for
redevelopment. Id. at 452, 463, 464; see also Repairing New Jersey's Eminent Domain Laws,
supra note 12 at 15 (characterizing pre-Gallenthinjudicial review as "anemic"), id. at 15 n.36
(collecting cases applying the standard used in Gallenthin).
211.
885 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2005).
212. Id.at 513.
213. Id. The property owner also alleged that this percentage would be higher but for
the fact that the municipality required all leases to contain a provision whereby the tenant
agreed to move on demand. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 515. The building had never been cited for a code violation except over
overgrown weeds. Id.
216. Id. at 517.
217. Id. at 516. The court also observed that the Department of Community Affairs
had published guidelines for preparing a redevelopment report and the municipality's expert
did not follow these guidelines. Id. at 516-17; see generally WILLIAM M. Cox & DONALD M.
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upheld the City's redevelopment designation. The Appellate Division held
that the redevelopment designation was improper. z8
Unfortunately, questionable blight designations were not always
corrected by the courts. Judicial application of the "substantial evidence"
standard was often inconsistent and appeared to grant municipalities
unassailable discretion in making redevelopment designations.2 19 In ERETC,
for example, the trial court initially upheld the municipality's redevelopment
designation. 220 Had the property owners in ERETC not persevered through a
time-consuming and costly appeal, they would have been unable to prevent
the likely taking of their productive and well-kept property. 1
Additionally, courts frequently stated the substantial evidence standard
in seemingly inconsistent and contradictory terms. In Mead Johnson & Co. v.
222 for example, the Appellate Division
Borough of South Plainfield,
articulated the standard as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." 223 Yet, in D&M Asbury Realty v. City
of Asbury Park, the Appellate Division described substantial evidence as
"any set of facts [that] may reasonably be conceived to justify" the
redevelopment designation. 24 Most recently, in City of Long Branch v.
Brower, the trial court held that a challenge to a redevelopment designation
''can overcome a presumption of validity only by proofs that there could

Ross, NEW JERSEY ZONING AND LAND USE ADMINISTRATION § 38-4 (2007) (describing the

basic administrative and procedural requirements for making a redevelopment designation).
218. ERETC, 885 A.2d at 520.
219. Compare Mead Johnson & Co. v. Borough of S. Plainfield, 231 A.2d 816, 821-22
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (describing substantial evidence standard as "such evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.") with City of Long
Branch v. Brower, No. MON-L-4987-05, 2006 WL 1746120, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div,
June 22, 2006) (stating that designation cannot be overturned under substantial evidence
standard unless there is "no set of facts that would rationally support a conclusion that the
enactment is in the public interest."), overruled by City of Long Branch v. Anzalone, No. A0067-06T2, 2008 WL 3090052 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 7, 2008) (per curiam).
220. ERETC, 885 A.2d at 515-16.
221.
The city required the property owners to include a provision in their leases with
tenants stating that the tenants would agree to move out of the building "on demand,"
suggesting that the municipality did, in fact, intend to take the property. Id. at 515.
222. 231 A.2d 816 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).
223. Id. at 821-22.
224. No. A-3033-03T5, 2005 WL 3693210, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 24,
2006) (per curiam). Likewise, in Downtown Residents for Sane Development v. City of
Hoboken, 576 A.2d 926, 927 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), the Appellate Division stated
that a court must uphold a redevelopment designation unless it is "shown to be arbitrary or
capricious, contrary to law, or unconstitutional" and not merely "debatable."
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have been no set of facts that would rationally support a conclusion that the
225
enactment is in the public interest.,
Those varied enunciations of the substantial evidence standard did not
provide property owners with a predictable basis for challenging
redevelopment designations and provide too great an opportunity for abuse
of property rights. Meaningful property right protections require a more
reliable standard of review that does not undermine legitimate redevelopment
projects, but forces municipalities to justify their designations with genuinely
substantial evidence.
V. GALLENTHIN AND ITS PROGENY: MOVING TOWARDS A BALANCED
APPROACH TO REDEVELOPMENT AND PROPERTY RIGHT PROTECTIONS

Viewed within the context of New Jersey's redevelopment experience,
Gallenthin's significance is apparent. First, Gallenthin put to rest the notion
that the blighted areas clause granted the legislature plenary redevelopment
authority. Gallenthin unequivocally established that the blighted areas clause
circumscribes the legislature's redevelopment mandate. 2 6 Second,
Gallenthin clarified that the substantial evidence standard requires
redevelopment designations to be supported by meaningful, quantitative
evidence. 2 7 Further, the cases decided after Gallenthin demonstrate that
these principles have resulted in increased judicial oversight of municipal
redevelopment without inhibiting important redevelopment initiatives that
serve the common weal. 228 This section provides an analysis of the court's
decision in Gallenthin and surveys several significant post-Gallenthincases.

225. No. MON-L-4987-05, 2006 WL 1746120, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div, June
22, 2006) overruled by City of Long Branch v. Anzalone, No. A-0067-06T2, 2008 WL
3090052 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 7, 2008) (per curiam).
226. See Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 456
(N.J. 2007) ("By adopting the Blighted Areas Clause, the People entrusted certain powers to
the Legislature, and the courts are responsible for ensuring that the terms of that trust are
honored and enforced.").
227. Id. at 465 ("The substantial evidence standard is not met if a municipality's
decision is supported by only the net opinion of an expert.. .. In general, a municipality must
establish a record that contains more than a bland recitation of applicable statutory criteria and
a declaration that those criteria are met.").
228. See, e.g., City of Long Branch v. Anzalone, No. A-0067-06T2, 2008 WL
3090052, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 7, 2008) (per curiam) (overturning a
redevelopment designation but remanding the case for the municipality to have an opportunity
develop a record that satisfies the Gallenthin standard).
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A. Gallenthin v. Borough of Paulsboro
1. Paulsboro's Interpretation and Application of the LRHL
The parcel at issue in Gallenthin consisted of approximately sixty-three
acres of largely vacant wetlands that the Borough of Paulsboro declared to be
"in need of redevelopment., 22 9 The property was adjacent to an inactive
British Petroleum storage facility, which Paulsboro had previously included
in its redevelopment plan. 230 The New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection's Geographic Information System identified the Gallenthin parcel
as protected wetlands. 23' Thus, other than sporadic use as a depository for
dredging materials, the site was used only for occasional agricultural
purposes and contained no improvements except an unused railroad spur, an
active gas pipeline, and several unused mooring pylons.232
The Gallenthin property was added to the redevelopment plan based on a
cursory report by the Borough's engineer, which simply described the
property as stagnant, unproductive, and subject to redevelopment,2 33 and the
testimony of the Planning Board's professional planner.234 The planner also
stated, in a conclusory manner, that the property was subject to
redevelopment because it was stagnant and unproductive. 235 At the public
229. Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 451.
230. Id.at 449-50. Paulsboro first designated the adjacent British Petroleum plant as a
redevelopment area and did not include the Gallenthin property in that redevelopment plan. Id.
at 450.
231. Idat45l.
232. Id. at 450. There was some evidence that the Gallenthin property was
conveniently situated for construction of a bridge to service the redeveloped plant, but this
scenario was untenable because the wetlands designation would likely have precluded
construction of a bridge. Id.
233. Id.at 452.
234. Id.at 452-53.
235. Id.at 452. In fact, the planner's testimony was expressly based on his
interpretation of the statutory criteria. Id.The Planning Board's expert stated he believed N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5(e) (West 2008) permitted redevelopment of property that was "not
fully productive" for any reason whatsoever if it was useful for the public welfare. Id.at 452.
Gallenthin's expert testified that the Planning Board's expert was interpreting the statute too
broadly. Id.Ultimately, the Planning Board based its determination on the testimony of its
own expert. Id.at 453. However, the most significant point to be drawn from these facts is that
the Planning Board relied upon its planning expert to interpret the statute, and, in adopting the
expert's recommendation, the Planning Board adopted the planner's interpretation of the
statute. The disagreement between the two experts was not about the quantitative evidence
that described the condition of the property. Rather, the experts disagreed about the meaning
of the statute, which is an issue of law that was not entitled to deference.

488
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hearing before the Planning Board, Gallenthins' expert testified that its
property was valuable because it consisted of protected wetlands and had
various agricultural uses.236
The municipality nevertheless determined that the property met the sixth
statutory criterion for redevelopment under the LRHL, which permits a
redevelopment designation if the municipality finds:
A growing lack or total lack of proper utilization of areas caused by the
condition of the title, diverse ownership of the real property therein or
other conditions, resulting in a stagnant or not fully productive
condition of land potentially useful and valuable for contributing to and
serving the public health, safety and welfare.237
In making its redevelopment designation, Paulsboro expressly interpreted the
above language to permit redevelopment of any area that is "not fully
productive" but is useful for serving the public.238 Based on this
interpretation of the statute, Paulsboro concluded that there was substantial
evidence that the property was "not fully productive" and, therefore, "in need
of redevelopment. ,23 The only evidence relied on by the municipality was
24 °
the fact that the property consisted of vacant, unimproved wetlands.
Gallenthin challenged the redevelopment designation. 24' The trial court
upheld the redevelopment designation as based on substantial evidence but
did not address whether Paulsboro's interpretation of the LRHL was
consistent with the statute or the blighted areas clause.242 The Appellate
Division also upheld Paulsboro's designation without addressing whether
236. Id.at 453.
237. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A: 12A-5(e) (West 2008).
238. The Borough's interpretation of the statute involved the use of "or" in two
separate phrases in subsection 5(e). Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 454-56, 460. First, the Borough
interpreted the phrase "stagnant or not fully productive" to mean that the property need only
be "not fully productive" and not "stagnant." Id.at 454-55. The Borough concluded that
because the Gallenthin property could be put to a more enterprising use, it qualified as "not
fully productive." Second, the Borough interpreted the phrase "caused by the condition of the
title, diverse ownership of the real property therein or other conditions" to mean that the
property could be redeveloped so long as its "not fully productive" condition was caused by
"other conditions," i.e. any possible conditions. Id.at 455. Thus, the Borough interpreted the
LHRL to permit redevelopment of any property that is "not fully productive" yet potentially
valuable for "contributing to and serving the public health, safety and welfare." Id.at 455.
239. Id.at 453-54.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, No. A-6941-03T1, 2006
WL 1932581, at *9-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 14, 2006) (per curiam) (quoting trial
court's oral decision), overruled by 924 A.2d 447 (N.J. 2007).
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Paulsboro's interpretation of the LRHL exceeded the scope of the blighted
areas clause.243
2. The Court's Opinion
Not surprisingly, Paulsboro's threshold argument before the supreme
court was that the blighted areas clause divested the judiciary of authority to
review the LRHL and gave that the legislature plenary authority to define
"blight." 244 Paulsboro relied principally on the court's holding in Wilson as
support for this argument.245 Paulsboro also argued that the court should
uphold its interpretation of the LRHL because it was consistent with the
statute's plain meaning, namely that the statutory phrase "stagnant or not
fully productive" means that an area need only be "not fully productive" to
be subject to redevelopment.246
The court disagreed and invalidated Paulsboro's redevelopment
designation.24 7 The court's reasoning involved several steps. First, and most
important, the court held that the Legislature does not possess plenary
authority to define blight. 248 Rather, the court held that the term "blight" has
a constitutional meaning that circumscribes the Legislature's redevelopment
authority.2 49 Second, the court concluded that Paulsboro's interpretation of
the statute would render it unconstitutional because "blight" as used in the
blighted areas clause does not include all areas that are "not fully

243. Id. at *18. In fact, the only issue for review identified by the Appellate Division
was: "whether the designation of plaintiffs' land as an area in need of redevelopment was
supported by substantial credible evidence." Id. at * 12. Thus, the court only evaluated whether
there was substantial evidence on the record to support Paulsboro's designation, not whether
Paulsboro's designation was based on an unconstitutional reading of the statute.
244. See Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 456 (N.J. 2007); Amici Brief, supra note 154, at 6-9.
245. See Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 456 (N.J. 2007); Amici Brief, supra note 154, at 6-9.
246. Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 454 (N.J.
2007) (emphasis added).
247. Id. at 449.
248. Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 449.
249. The nature of the court's constitutional analysis should not be overlooked. The
court employed most all modalities of constitutional interpretation. The court reviewed the
text of the blighted areas clause, its history, and the intent of the delegates in originally
adopting the blighted areas clause. Id. at 456-58. The court also emphasized, however, that
New Jersey courts have long recognized that the constitution is a living charter that must
accommodate changing times. Id. at 458. The court also considered authority from other
jurisdictions. Id. at 459-60. This multi-faceted constitutional analysis suggests that although
the court articulated a basic definition of "blight," id. at 460, the constitutional meaning of the
term is subject to revision with time and experience.
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productive., 250 Finally, the court concluded that because Paulsboro's
interpretation of the LRHL would render it unconstitutional, the Legislature
intended an alternative, constitutional meaning that was consistent with the
statutes text, structure, and history. 25 ' Thus, the court held that the particular
provision of the LRHL that Paulsboro relied on 252 applies only to "areas that,
as a whole, are stagnant and unproductive because of issues of title, diversity
of ownership, or other similar conditions. 253 The court therefore invalidated
Paulsboro's redevelopment designation as beyond the scope of the LRHL. 254
B. ReclaimingJudicialReview of Redevelopment Designations:The
Legislature's CircumscribedRedevelopment Authority After Gallenthin
In response to Paulsboro's claim that the blighted areas clause divested
the judiciary of authority to review the legislature's definition of "blight," the
court wrote: "By adopting the Blighted Areas Clause, the People entrusted
certain powers to the Legislature, and the courts are responsible for ensuring
that the terms of that trust are honored and enforced. We find no merit to
Paulsboro's assertion that the Blighted Areas Clause divests the Judiciary of
that responsibility. '255 The court further explained that the "Blighted Areas
Clause authorizes governmental entities to exercise eminent domain power in
respect of 'blighted areas.' . . . The Clause operates as both a grant and a
256
limit on the State's redevelopment authority.
Although the court did not overrule Wilson,257 Gallenthin signaled a
change from the judicial acquiescence that characterized review of

250. Id.at 460. The court stated that "[wie need not examine every shade of gray
coloring a concept as elusive as 'blight' to conclude that the term's meaning cannot extend as
far as Paulsboro contends." Id.
251. Id. at 460-65.
252. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5(e) (West 2008).
253. Gallenthin,924 A.2d at 449.
254. Id. at 464. Technically, therefore, the court did not hold that the designation was
unconstitutional. Rather the court held that Paulsboro's designation exceeded the intended
scope of the statute. Id.However, this technical reading of the court's decision should not be
over emphasized. The court expressly found that the Legislature could not have intended
Paulsboro's interpretation of the statute because such an interpretation would render the
statute unconstitutional. Id. at 460.
255. Id.at 456.
256. Id.
257. Indeed, the court actually cited portions of its opinion in Wilson with approval.
See id. at 458-59.
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redevelopment

legislation after

Wilson.25 8 As a constitutional matter,

Gallenthin clarified that the Legislature's redevelopment authority was
circumscribed by the blighted areas clause and that the Judiciary was
responsible, in the first instance, for monitoring and enforcing the scope of
that authority. 259 As a practical matter, Gallenthin served as a reminder to
lower courts that municipal interpretations of the LHRL's redevelopment
criteria are to be reviewed de novo and provided the courts with a
manageable definition of "blight" by which to review these
determinations.26 °
This aspect of the court's holding warrants discussion. First, by declaring
that the constitution limits redevelopment to only "blighted areas" and that
the Judiciary is responsible for ascertaining and enforcing the constitutional
meaning of that term, the court reversed almost fifty years of judicial
acquiescence to statutory definitions of "blight. 2 61 Indeed, the court's
analysis under the blighted areas clause-that municipal interpretations of
"blight" must be reviewed by the Judiciary to determine whether they are
within the scope of the constitution's redevelopment mandate-was the first
of its kind by a New Jersey court since Wilson. 262 Second, as a necessary
predicate to this analysis, the court had to ascertain the constitutional

258. See supra Part III.C (arguing that Wilson resulted in judicial acquiescence to the
Legislature's expansive definitions of blight).
259. See Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 456 ("By adopting the Blighted Areas Clause, the
People entrusted certain powers to the Legislature, and the courts are responsible for ensuring
that the terms of that trust are honored and enforced.").
260. Indeed, although it is still too early to ascertain the full effect of Gallenthin, it
appears that lower courts have begun to engage in more searching review of redevelopment
designations after Gallenthin. See Posting of Diane Sterner, to NJ Voices,
http://www.blog.nj.com/njvdiane-sterner/2007/07/courts act will legislature_fo.html (July
31, 2007, 14:57 EST) (crediting Gallenthin with a series of trial court decisions invalidating

redevelopment designations in Monmouth County).
261. See supra Part III.A (discussing judicial review of redevelopment legislation after
1947 and before Gallenthin).
262. In Forbes v. Bd.of Trustees of South Orange, 712 A.2d 255, 257 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. 1998), the Appellate Division recognized that an independent analysis under the
blighted areas clause may be appropriate. Id.However, relying on Wilson, the Panel did not

examine the blighted areas clause to determine whether it prohibited the LRHL's expansive
definition of Blight. See also Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Princeton, 851 A.2d

685, 701-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (recognizing a constitutional challenge to the
Legislature's enactment of the LRHL but failing to address whether the municipality's
interpretation of the LRHL was constitutionally overbroad).
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meaning of the phrase "blighted areas," a task that no New Jersey court had
engaged in since the Clause was adopted in 1947.263
The court's interpretation of the phrase "blighted areas" now provides
the outer limits of the State's redevelopment authority. In defining the term,
the court drew upon many modalities of constitutional interpretation. The
court first examined the term's plain meaning and concluded that the phrase
"presumes deterioration or stagnation that negatively affects surrounding
areas." 264 The court also reviewed the deliberations at the 1947
Constitutional Convention and concluded that the phrase was265intended to
include the statutory definitions of "blight" in effect at that time.
The court emphasized that New Jersey courts have long interpreted the
constitution as a "living charter-designed to serve the ages and to be
adaptable to the developing problems of the times. 266 The court found that
the Legislature's expansion of the phrase under the BAA and its application
to rural and suburban areas was within the constitutional meaning of the
phrase.2 67 Ultimately, however, the court concluded that notwithstanding the
word's evolution, "the term retains its essential characteristic: deterioration
or stagnation that negatively affects surrounding properties. 2 68 This
description represents the scope of the State's redevelopment authority and
provides the standard for judicial review of redevelopment legislation and
municipal interpretations of that legislation.
In the two years after Gallenthin, lower courts have navigated the shoals
of eminent domain with Gallenthin as a compass. For example, in the much
publicized case of City of Long Branch v. Anzalone,2 6 the Appellate
Division invalidated a redevelopment designation by the City of Long
Branch based on Gallenthin's "heightened standard. 270 The panel
recognized that Gallenthin stands for the proposition that the "New Jersey
Constitution requires a finding of actual blight before private property may

263. In Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgwater, 274 A.2d 1, 5-6 (N.J. 1971), the court
engaged in a thorough analysis of the meaning of "blight." However, the entirety of this
analysis was concerned with whether the challenged designation was within the Legislature's
intent when it enacted the BAA. Id.The court did not engage in, or even mention an
independent analysis under the blighted areas clause.
264. Gallenthin, 457 A.2d at 360.
265. Id.at 457-59.
266. Id.at 458 (quoting Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 845 (N.J. 1977).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. A-0067-06T2, 2008 WL 3090052 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (per curiam).
270. Id.at *1.
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be taken for the purpose of redevelopment., 271 More revealing, the panel
expressly found that Gallenthinestablished a new and "heightened standard"
of judicial review for redevelopment designations.27 2
The panel further explained that although Gallenthin involved only one
of the LRHL's seven criteria for designating property as "in need of
redevelopment," the court's "analysis of the constitutional and legislative
history applies equally" to all of the LRH{L's redevelopment criteria.273 Thus,
the appellate court reviewed the City's legal interpretation of each statutory
criteria de novo to ensure that the municipality had not expanded the LRHL
beyond the scope of the blighted areas clause 27 4 -a probing review that was
unheard of before Gallenthin. The panel found that although the City had
substantial evidence to support its conclusion that "private investment would
make the area more productive and contribute to the public health, safety,
and welfare," Gallenthin "explained that the meaning of 'blight' did not
extend to an area in which the only negative condition was suboptimal land
use." 275 The appellate court therefore invalidated the City's redevelopment
would
designation because the City's expansive interpretation of the LRHL
276
Gallenthin.
in
interpreted
as
clause
areas
blighted
the
of
run afoul
Similarly, in BMIA, Inc. v. Belmar,277 the Appellate Division reinstated a
property owner's complaint challenging the Borough of Belmar's
redevelopment designation.278 The Borough of Belmar determined that the
subject area met the LRHL's redevelopment criteria because it was
underutilized and unattractive to "private investment of any significant
commercial or residential development., 279 The property owner filed a
complaint alleging that the Borough's interpretation of the LRHL was
271. Id. Thus the Appellate Division held that "[u]nder Gallenthin, the absence of
substantial evidence of blight invalidates all of the City's findings under [the LRHL] that
appellants' properties were in need of redevelopment. Therefore, we need not address those
findings in further detail." Id. at *21.
272. Id. at *1. The panel expressly found that in light of Gallenthin's new standard,
which was not in effect when the City made its initial redevelopment designation, "fairness"
required the matter to be remanded to give the City an opportunity "to amplify the record in an
effort to meet the Gallenthin standard." Id. at * 1.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at *18.
276. Id. at *21-24 (explaining that because the case was remanded based on city's
misinterpretation of the LRHL, it was unnecessary for the panel to review the evidence on the
record).
277. A-5974-05T5, 2008 WL 281687 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (per curiam).
278. Id. at *1.
279. Id.
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unconstitutional, which the trial court dismissed. 280 The Appellate Division
reinstated the complaint because "although there [was] evidence that the area
could be better utilized," there was no evidence
that the property was
28
"blighted" as defined by the court in Gallenthin. 1
However, post-Gallenthin judicial review has not squelched legitimate
redevelopment aimed at curing harmful blight. In Citizens in Action v. Mt.
Holly,282 for example, the Appellate Division reviewed the Township's
interpretation of the LRHL and concluded that the area was within the
State's redevelopment authority. 283 The Township based its redevelopment
designation on three LRHL criteria. 284 The panel concluded that in view of
the court's decision in Gallenthin, only one of the criteria identified by the
Township properly applied to the subject area. 285 However, the Panel
concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the application of
that single criterion 286 and, therefore, redevelopment of the area did not
offend the blighted areas clause.287
This searching yet balanced judicial review stands in sharp contrast to
pre-Gallenthinjudicial review.288 Property owners can now obtain de novo
judicial review of a municipality's interpretation of the LRHL based on an
understandable definition of "blight., 289 This approach is consistent with the
blighted areas clause and promises a more predicable and balanced approach
to the tension between redevelopment and property rights.
C. Reclaiming JudicialReview of Redevelopment Designations:The
SubstantialEvidence StandardAfter Gallenthin
In Gallenthin, the Borough argued that its redevelopment designation
was supported by substantial evidence based on the testimony of its expert
280. Id.
281. Id. at *4.Critical to the panel's holding was its recognition that "[a] crucial
element in determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the court below correctly
interpreted the statutory criteria." Id.at *2.
282. A-1099-05T3, 2007 WL 1930457 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 5, 2007) (per
curiam).
283. Id.at *13.
284. Id.at *12.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See supraPart III.C (discussing pre-Gallenthinjudicial review).
289. This is also the popular perception of Gallenthin's significance. See Sterner
Posting, surpa, note 260.
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planner and a report by a separate professional planner.290 Both the report
and the expert's testimony simply declared that the property met the statutory
criteria for redevelopment because it was not being used in
291 an optimal
manner and could otherwise be developed to benefit the public.
Although the court concluded that it need not address whether there was
sufficient evidence on the record to support Paulsboro's redevelopment
designation, 9 2 it provided clarification on the substantial evidence standard
for "the future guidance of planning boards and court., 293 The court stated
that redevelopment designations are entitled to deference "provided that they
are supported by substantial evidence on the record., 294 However, the
opinion emphasized that issues of law are subject to de novo review and the
substantial evidence standard is not met "if a municipality's decision is
supported by only the net opinion of an expert., 295 It further explained that "a
municipality must establish a record that contains more than a bland
applicable statutory criteria and a declaration that those criteria
recitation29of
6
are met.

The court's "guidance" has tightened the "substantial evidence" standard
review
in two respects. First, it reaffirmed that only findings of fact or
of
legislative fact are entitled to deference. A municipality's interpretation of
the statutory criteria necessary for a redevelopment designation is not
entitled to deference and should be reviewed de novo.2 97 Indeed, Gallenthin
was decided entirely on Paulsboro's misinterpretation of the LRHL.298
Perhaps because of the misconception that the Legislature had plenary
redevelopment authority, pre-Gallenthin cases often neglected to review the
municipality's interpretation of the applicable statutory criteria to ensure that
it was consistent with the constitution. 299 Gallenthin underscored the
principle that courts must not defer to a municipality's interpretation of the

290. Gallenthin, 924 A.2d 447, 452-53.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 465 ("Because Paulsboro's redevelopment designation was based on an
improper interpretation of the LRHL, we need not address whether there was sufficient
evidence on the record to support the Borough's action.").
293. Id. at 464.
294. Id. at 465.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 915 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 2007) (a municipality's legal
determinations are subject to de novo review by courts).
298. Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 464.
299. See supra Part III.C (discussing pre-Gallenthinjudicial review).
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LRHL.30 Second, Gallenthin reaffirmed that "substantial evidence" requires
meaningful and quantitative evidence directed to the relevant statutory
criteria.30 ' Conclusory testimony by a planner that the statutory criteria are
evidence
met is not substantial evidence.3 0 2 The municipality must30 provide
3
that supports its conclusion that the property is "blighted.
Again, this portion of the court's decision has not been lost on lower
courts since Gallenthin. Indeed, in Anzalone, the court invalidated the
redevelopment designation based on the municipality's potential
misinterpretation of the LRHL in light of the court's recent holding in
Gallenthin.304 Nevertheless, the panel offered its analysis of whether the
statutory criteria were supported by substantial evidence to guide the parties
on remand. 30 5 The City had based its redevelopment designation on, among
other things, a survey of the external conditions of the subject properties,
which concluded that the properties were generally debilitated and subject to
redevelopment,30 6 and a conclusory opinion that the subject area could be put
to more efficient use through redevelopment.3 0 7 Citing Gallenthin, the panel
concluded that this did not constitute substantial evidence.30 8
In BMIA, LLC v. Belmar,30 9 the panel expressly embraced Gallenthin's
exhortation that a municipality's interpretation of the LRHL is not entitled to
deference.3 10 Citing Gallenthin, the panel stated that although a
municipality's findings of fact are entitled to deference, "the substantial
evidence standard is inappropriate when the municipality's decision is based
on evidence that is not tailored to the correct statutory criteria." 311 In such
circumstances, the municipality's conclusion that the statute was
nevertheless intended to apply is a legal conclusion subject to de novo
review.31 2

300. Indeed, the court engaged in a searching review of the record to ascertain the
Borough's interpretation of the statute. Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 455-56.
301, Id. at 464-65.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. A-0067-06T2 at 54-55, 2008 WL 3090052, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug.
7, 2008) (per curiam).
305. Id. at *1-2.
306. Id. at *2.
307. Id.
308. Id. at *1.
309. A-5974-05T5, 2008 WL 281687 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (per curiam).
310. Id. at *4.
311. Id. at *2.
312. Id.
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This more searching standard of review benefits both property owners
and municipalities. Although it will limit the areas that municipalities can
redevelop, it provides clarity concerning the sort of evidence that is
necessary to sustain redevelopment designations. Municipalities need only
develop a quantitative record directed to relevant statutory criteria in order to
proceed with legitimate redevelopment initiatives. It simultaneously provides
protection to property owners, who can now expect meaningful judicial
review of redevelopment designations.
VI. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AFTER GALLENTHIN

Although Gallenthin had "enormous significance, 313 because it clarified
that under the New Jersey Constitution only "blighted areas" can be
redeveloped and that the Judiciary is responsible for monitoring the State's
redevelopment authority, 314 Gallenthin is not a panacea. It is only the
beginning and not the end of this ongoing journey. Gallenthin's principles
have provided significant clarity to redevelopment practice in New Jersey,
but they also raise several new issues affecting courts, municipalities, and the
Legislature. Those issues can and will most likely be resolved through
legislation, or to borrow3 15Justice Frankfurter's phrase, through the process of
"elucidating litigation.
A. When Does the ConstitutionPermitRedevelopment of Non-Blighted
PropertyBecause it is Partof a LargerBlightedArea?
The court has long recognized that non-blighted parcels may be included
in a redevelopment plan for purposes of redeveloping a larger blighted
area. 316 In Levin, the court explained that the BAA was "concerned with
areas and not with individual properties.317 The fact that single parcels in the
area are useful and could not be declared blighted if considered in isolation is
basis neither for excluding such parcels nor for invalidating a declaration of
313. See Harrison Redevelopment Agency v. Derose, 942 A.2d 59, 78 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2008) (describing the proposition, revived by Gallenthin, that the blighted areas
clause permitted redevelopment of areas if they are determined to be blighted as having
"enormous significance").
314.

See supra Part V.B.

315. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzalez, 356 U.S. 617, 624 (1958).
316. Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 19 (N.J. 1971); see also
Lyons v. City of Camden, 226 A.2d 625, 631 (N.J. 1968); Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 142
A.2d 837, 847 (N.J. 1958).
317. 274A.2dat 19.
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blight."3 8 Like the BAA, the LRHL provides that a "redevelopment area
may include lands, buildings, or improvements which of themselves are not
detrimental to the public ... welfare, but the inclusion of which is found
necessary... for the effective redevelopment of the area of which they are a
' Additionally,
part."319
courts have long deferred to municipalities regarding
the appropriate boundaries of a redevelopment area.32 °
These rules were not problematic under the pre-Gallenthinparadigm that
assumed the Legislature's plenary redevelopment authority. 321 However,
because Gallenthin interpreted the blighted areas clause to limit the
Legislature's redevelopment authority to only "blighted areas, 322 it follows
that the Legislature does not possess plenary authority to define the required
nexus between non-blighted parcels and a larger redevelopment area. Indeed,
the blighted areas clause imposes some limitation on a municipality's
authority to include non-blighted parcels in a larger redevelopment area. The
exact nature of the required nexus, however, is an open issue.
The question may be somewhat inconsequential at present because the
LRHL already limits the inclusion of non-blighted parcels to those that are
"necessary" to redevelopment of the larger blighted area.323 This is surely a
high standard. Additionally, the court affirmed in Gallenthin that nonblighted parcels may be included in a larger redevelopment area.3 24 Indeed,
the court stated that if there had been substantial evidence that the nonblighted parcel at issue was "integral" to the municipality's larger
redevelopment plan, the court may not have invalidated the redevelopment
designation. 32 ' Nevertheless, property owners can challenge-under the
blighted areas clause-the inclusion of non-blighted parcels in a
redevelopment plan if the proffered nexus to the larger blighted area is

318. Id. See also Lyons, 226 A.2d at 631; Wilson, 142 A.2d at 847.
319. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A: 12A-3 (West 2009) (defining "redevelopment area").
320. Wilson, 142 A.2d at 847; see also Lyons, 52 N.J. at 98.
321. See supra Part III.B.
322. Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 456 (N.J.
2007).
323. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-3 (West 2009) ("A redevelopment area may include
lands, buildings, or improvements which of themselves are not detrimental to the public
health, safety or welfare, but the inclusion of which is found necessary, with or without
change in their condition, for the effective redevelopment of the area of which they are a
part.").
324. Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 465.
325. Id.
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attenuated.32 6 Future courts will have to ascertain the nexus required by the
blighted areas clause.
B. How Often Does the ConstitutionRequire Municipalitiesto Reevaluate
Their Redevelopment Designations?
Redevelopment designations can remain in effect for decades. 7 Several
recent cases have highlighted the likely possibility that an area may be
blighted when the municipality initially makes its redevelopment designation
but, as a result of the municipality's redevelopment initiatives or the owner's
own efforts, the property is no longer blighted.32 8 Because Gallenthin permits
redevelopment of only "blighted areas," 329 these cases raise another issue:
when does the New Jersey Constitution requires a municipality
to revise its
330
redevelopment plan to account for changes to the area?
In Dutch Neck Land Company, LLC v. Newark, for example, the City of
Newark conducted an investigation and adopted a redevelopment plan in
1963 that declared certain properties to be blighted.331 In October 2005, the
planning board passed a resolution making it possible for the City to take the
property for redevelopment without conducting a new investigation of the
property.33 The property owners challenged the ordinance because the
property was used as a profitable container terminal.333 The City took the
remarkable position that "because the subject property ha[d] already been
declared blighted in 1963, there was no legal reason for the Planning Board
to re-examine that finding in 2005."' 33
City of Long Branch v. Anzalone presented a more nuanced situation.
There, the City adopted a two-phase redevelopment plan in 1996, which
included the subject property in the second phase of redevelopment. 335 The
326. See City of Long Branch v. Anzalone, A-0067-6T2, 57-58, 2008 WL 3090052,
"16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 7, 2008) (per curiam).
327. See, e.g., Dutch Neck Land Co. v. Newark, No. A-5825-06T2, 5, 2008 WL
2026506, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 14, 2008) (per curiam) (explaining that
redevelopment plan was originally adopted in 1963 and had a forty-year sunset provision).
328. See, e.g., Dutch Neck Land Co., 2008 WL 2026506 at *10; Anzalone, 2008 WL
3090052 at *16.
329. Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 456.
330. See Anzalone, 2008 WL 3090052 at *16.
331. 2008 WL 2026506 at*1.
332. Id. at *6.
333. Id. at *3.
334. Id. at *4.
335. 2008 WL 3090052 at *9.

RUTGERSLAWJOURATAL

[Vol. 40:451

City completed the initial phase of the redevelopment plan in 2005 and
began proceedings to take the subject properties in order to complete the
second phase.336 The property owners challenged the taking of their property
by arguing, among other things, that the first phase of redevelopment had
been successful and their properties were no longer necessary for the
redevelopment of the larger area.337 Although the Appellate Division
remanded the case on other grounds, it noted that the investment of
"substantial funds, public and private," in the first phase of redevelopment
are not factors that can "trump the rights of property owners" to contest the
taking of the property based on its current condition.33 8
Those cases raise the important issue of when does a legitimate blight
designation become obsolete under the blighted areas clause. There are
obvious practical concerns associated with constant revision of
redevelopment plans. Most notably, private investors may be deterred from
investing in important redevelopment projects if there is a significant chance
that the project will not be completed to the extent originally planned.339
Nevertheless, as illustrated by Dutch Neck Land Company, redevelopment
designations must be revised at some point. Future cases will require courts
to decide at what point the blighted areas clause requires municipalities to
review their redevelopment plans.
CONCLUSION

Redevelopment has special value in New Jersey because of excessive
demands on New Jersey's developable land. Unlike many less developed
states, a fair degree of government intervention is necessary to protect New
Jersey's communities from harmful blight. Redevelopment is important in
many of New Jersey's urban and exurban areas in order to impede further
decay. It is imperative, however, that New Jersey provide property owners
with appropriate protections from unjustified and excessive redevelopment
projects.
The framers of New Jersey's 1947 Constitution understood that tension.
They crafted a constitutional provision that provides incentives for private
redevelopment but limits redevelopment to "blighted areas." In so doing, the
336. Id. at *16.
337. Id. at *15-16.
338. Id. at *24.
339. This was the position taken by the City in Anzalone. See, 2008 WL 3090052, at
*16; Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 57-58, Anzalone, A-0067-6T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Aug. 7, 2008).
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framers entrusted New Jersey's courts with responsibility for monitoring and
enforcing the acceptable balance between redevelopment and property rights.
Future cases will wrestle with the evolving meaning of "blight" and the
dynamic tension between redevelopment and property rights. Gallenthin,
however, began to restore structural balance to the debate and revive the
Judiciary's responsibility to provide meaningful review of redevelopment
designations.

